To support the government’s policy of extending compulsory military service to one year, the Ministry of Education has introduced a “3+1” program where conscripts can finish college in three years and military service in one year, enabling them to graduate alongside those who do not have to serve. To achieve this, universities are required to raise the cap on the number of credits draftees can earn per semester. They should also offer summer courses and allow draftees to take classes at other colleges.
The program has drawn criticism from some quarters. Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators said it would sacrifice students’ education rights and that conscripts would be “burning the candle at both ends” by juggling schoolwork and conscription. KMT Legislator Charles Chen (陳以信) added that it is sexist in nature, as women do not need to serve and would therefore not be eligible for the program.
Premier Chen Chien-jen (陳建仁) said that the program is not compulsory, but an option for draftees to better plan their studies and service period.
As President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said last year, the reinstatement of the one-year military service is “an inevitable responsibility” in the face of rising cross-strait tensions. Before the compulsory military service was shortened to four months in 2013, draftees usually chose to perform their one-year service after graduating from college, so they entered the workforce one year later than their female counterparts. To address this problem, the ministry introduced the 3+1 program to give draftees more flexibility in planning their career while bolstering the nation’s defense capabilities.
It is true that the program is “discriminatory” in nature. For one, female students are not eligible for the program and its “perks.” However, critics are barking up the wrong tree because the crux of the matter is that only men, according to Article 1 of the Act of Military Service System (兵役法), “are obligated to take military service.” Women can only join the armed forces as volunteers. To promote gender equality, critics should urge the government to include women in the military service, instead of finding fault with a program that is designed with draftees in mind.
Another major concern with the program is that it would undermine students’ education rights. Several top universities have shortened each semester to 16 weeks in hopes that students can use the extra time to participate in exchange programs, internships or other extracurricular activities, giving them more leeway to explore their interests and develop independent thinking. However, the 3+1 program goes against the spirit of this trend, as students would have to go back to adopting a jam-packed schedule, not to mention sacrificing summer and winter breaks for studies.
Nevertheless, as the program is optional, students have the choice to go for a “less condensed” college life. As entering college is the first step to leading an independent life, it is also a period where students are free to make their own schedules and plans. Whether a person graduates with exceptional knowledge, skills or competencies would be of their doing, the program notwithstanding.
Critics of the program should remember that it takes time to train a conscript and eligible males can fulfill their one-year military service during or after college. It should be up to them to make that decision, not politicians or critics.
More importantly, the public should bear in mind that China will never give up on using force to annex Taiwan. The nation is in dire need of beefing up its defenses and making things easier for male conscripts is the least the government can do for them. The program is not intended to inconvenience or undermine male students’ education rights, but to ensure that freedom in the classroom and a democratic way of life can continue.
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