The Bamboo Union’s (竹聯幫) Ming-ren Division (明仁會) on March 7 held a high-profile banquet to show off its financial clout in what was a recruitment drive for the organized crime outfit. The event received significant media coverage, sending confusing messages to the public about social values, and making the work of law enforcers more difficult.
After the banquet, the National Police Agency cracked down on criminal activities with a special task force against organized crime and implemented “third-party policing” to root out suspected offenders.
The nature and activities of crime groups have changed. From aggressive debt collection, operating entertainment venues and involving themselves in land development projects, these groups have shifted their focus to large-scale fraud, cross-border money laundering, online gambling and the drug trade.
Cross-border crime is more lucrative and harder to detect, and gangs organize events to brazenly recruit members. Law enforcement needs to adapt to their methods.
Article 11 of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime says that countries “shall endeavor to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of [offenders] are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences.”
That is, crackdowns on gangsters need to hurt criminals to be effective.
Based on my research into organized crime, forcing criminals to work without pay would be a more threatening prospect than being imprisoned.
Even though Judicial Yuan Constitutional Interpretation No. 812 states that “forced labor” contravenes Article 8 of the Constitution on protecting personal freedom, it could be a feasible system if the principle of proportionality and the principle of explicit distinctions in the Constitution are adopted.
Legislation to reintroduce a system that is similar to “compulsory vocational training” should again be considered.
Telecommunications fraud and online gambling have become new sources of funding for organized crime. Only scientific and technological investigations can effectively cut the source of these financial flows.
However, Taiwan has no legal basis for such investigations to adhere to the UN convention so that it can take measures “for the use of other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover operations, by its competent authorities in its territory for the purpose of effectively combating organized crime.”
The Legislative Yuan should consider adding provisions to the Organized Crime Prevention Act (組織犯罪防制條例) to allow the use of location tracking technology and source telecommunications surveillance.
Finally, in response to the high-profile and controversial Bamboo Union banquet, legislation should be adopted based on the principle of “administration first, then justice,” in which the use of language, actions or other methods can be interpreted as indicative of membership in a criminal organization.
That is, behaviors linked with criminal organizations or their members should be considered grounds to punish these arrogant offenders.
That would include gatherings of three or more people in public places at events such as spring banquets or funerals where a criminal organization is able to flaunt its influence and disturb public order, cause anxiety or fear among the public. It would also include failure to disband after authorities have ordered them do so on more than three occasions.
Hsu Fu-seng is a professor and director of Central Police University’s Department of Administration Police.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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