China’s imposition of a no-fly zone north of Taiwan for 27 minutes tomorrow is expected to affect 33 international flights in the region, Minister of Transportation and Communications Wang Kwo-tsai (王國材) said.
Wang on Wednesday said he spoke with officials at the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau about Beijing’s restriction, which is thought to be related to expected debris from a Chinese satellite launch. Commercial vessels have also been told to avoid the 85-nautical-mile (157km) area north of Taiwan, he said.
The ministry on Wednesday said that Beijing reduced the flight-restriction period from three days to less than 30 minutes following protests from Taiwanese civil aviation officials. It is unlikely that Beijing made such a major change to its plans to respect Taiwan, and much more likely that it had miscalculated the scope of its effect on other countries, which most likely also lodged strong protests. Wang said that the original plans would have affected about 480 international flights over the course of three days. The economic impact would have been extensive, especially given that airline traffic is beginning to return to normal following the COVID-19 pandemic.
That China was able to narrow the window of the debris ocean impact to less than 30 minutes shows that the likely reason for the initial three-day flight restriction was to increase pressure on Taiwan and the US. China conducted three days of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait following a meeting between President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and US House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy. The day after those drills ended, the US began its largest joint exercises with the Philippines, only a few weeks after the Philippines granted the US access to four new military bases. It can be no coincidence that China suddenly attempted to impose a three-day no-fly zone within the Taipei Flight Information Region after the start of those drills.
The flight restriction was likely a part of Beijing’s “gray zone” warfare strategy against Taiwan, which security analyst William Chung (鍾志東) first warned about in June 2020. China has imposed air and sea restrictions against Taiwan in the past, such as in October 2020 when it prevented a military chartered supply flight operated by Uni Air from flying to the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands, 東沙群島) in the South China Sea, saying that “dangerous activities” were being conducted in Hong Kong airspace, which the Pratas Islands fall within.
Retired lieutenant general Chang Yen-ting (張延廷) at the time warned that the government must have a contingency plan should China prevent flights from reaching other Taiwan-controlled islands, such as those in Kinmen and Lienchiang counties. In August last year when then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi made a stopover in Taipei, China held drills around Taiwan disrupting air and sea traffic in the area for several days.
Analysts said that China scaled back the recent drills due to the backlash it received from the drills following Pelosi’s Taipei visit. The immediacy with which Beijing reduced its three-day flight restriction to only 27 minutes, likely also following international pressure, demonstrates that Beijing practices caution despite its clamorous rhetoric.
The importance of Taiwanese semiconductors to the global economy, and the importance of Taipei as a hub for travel and trade, means that China is limited in how much pressure it can exert on Taiwan. However, the government must ensure its ability to respond quickly to China by maintaining good communication with friendly nations, and continue efforts to join the International Civil Aviation Organization.
China is unlikely to scale up drills around Taiwan, or to attempt an invasion of Taiwan, in the near future, as it knows that doing so would be detrimental to its own interests. Nevertheless, Taiwan must be ready for every contingency.
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