The visit by French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平) proved to be more momentous than expected. While Von der Leyen delivered a clear deterrent message on Ukraine, human rights and Taiwan, Macron gave Xi a double gift and seriously damaged Western solidarity.
First, he effectively legitimized Beijing’s claim to Taiwan by equating it to political unity in Europe, saying: “As Europeans, our concern is our unity. The Chinese are also concerned with their unity, and Taiwan is a component [of this unity] from their point of view.”
He did not mention Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claim of “Russian unity” to justify invading Ukraine.
Macron then distanced France from Washington’s position, saying: “Do we [Europeans] have an interest in speeding up on the subject of Taiwan? No. The worst of things would be to think that we Europeans must be followers [one translation said “vassals”] on this subject and adapt ourselves to an American rhythm and a Chinese overreaction.”
In a separate interview, he said: “We don’t want to get into a bloc versus bloc logic... We should not be caught up in a disordering of the world and crises that aren’t ours.”
So far, US President Joe Biden’s administration has downplayed the obvious schism between France and the rest of the West on China and Taiwan, but the gap is too wide to ignore.
Before the neo-isolationist posture of Macron gains momentum in Europe, Biden needs to articulate not only the moral basis for defending Taiwan against Chinese aggression, but also the strategic imperative.
Taiwan in the hands of an aggressive communist China would threaten Southeast Asia just as Imperial Japan did in World War II using its “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” as US General Douglas MacArthur described Formosa. What Macron calls “crises that aren’t ours” suddenly would be everyone’s, as happened on Dec. 7, 1941.
Biden needs to formalize his four off-hand commitments to defend Taiwan. Whether China took at face value any of those remarks or the single less explicit ones by former US presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump is unknown, because administration officials immediately said US policy had not changed, without stating what the policy is on defending Taiwan.
That no US administration has been willing to make that commitment in a formal policy declaration dilutes the deterrent message to China’s political leaders and strategic planners.
The US policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan was stated concisely by former US assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995. When asked by Chinese officials what the US would do if China attacked Taiwan, he said: “We don’t know and you don’t know; it would depend on the circumstances.” Nye did not mention the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the US to “maintain the capacity to resist” a use of force against Taiwan, but does not mandate it.
Then-US secretary of defense William Perry said Nye’s statement “perfectly” expressed US policy, and no administration since has repudiated or modified it. The Trump and Biden administrations quietly opposed the US Congress’ attempts to clarify Washington’s resolve through the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, which would have provided advance authorization for the executive branch to come to Taiwan’s defense.
Now that Macron has urged the US’ allies in Europe to stay out of the US-China confrontation over Taiwan, Biden needs to make the public case for Western unity even more strongly than he has on Ukraine.
Joseph Bosco is a fellow of the Institute for Taiwan-American Studies.
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