China says that it has official diplomatic relations with 181 countries on the basis of its “one China” principle, but a study published by a National University of Singapore (NUS) academic found that only 51 countries fully comply with Beijing’s definition of “one China.”
As China ups its intimidation of Taiwan, more countries are taking a clearer stance, defining Taiwan as an independent sovereign nation separate from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
In the paper published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, NUS assistant professor Chong Ja Ian (莊嘉穎) says that many countries use different wording: Forty-one countries “recognize” the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China with no explicit mention of Taiwan’s sovereignty, 16 countries only “take note of” China’s claim, the US and nine other countries “acknowledge” the PRC’s claim, six countries “understand” or “respect” the claim and many others neither recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China nor mention Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Countries use a broad range of official formulations beyond Beijing’s “one China” principle, thus they could have diplomatic relations with the PRC and robust unofficial ties with Taiwan.
However, as China pursues its claim over Taiwan, as well as the South China and East China seas, its expansionist plans and attempts to stand with Russia as an authoritarian partner have pushed democratic countries to clarify their stance on Taiwan, either opposing the “one China” principle or calling for the maintenance of the “status quo” within the geopolitical reality that Taiwan is already an independent, sovereign nation separate from the PRC. Many countries are also in support of Taiwan’s self-determination. US President Joe Biden has said that, although the US’ “one China” policy does not encourage Taiwanese independence, “Taiwan makes their own judgements about their independence... That’s their decision.”
Taipei has changed its position on the “one China” principle to deal with different realities. In the Martial Law era, the Republic of China (ROC) government under the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime declared itself the legitimate government of China, including Taiwan. Today, the Democratic Progressive Party government objects to China’s claims over Taiwan, saying that Taiwan is already a sovereign state, so there is no need to declare independence.
However, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in his report at the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress last year insisted on a stricter “one China” principle and pushing for unification with Taiwan, irrespective of what Taiwanese want.
Chong’s study also says that Beijing pressured Taipei to adopt the so-called “1992 consensus,” but refuses any alternative to its “one China” principle, including the “different interpretations” the KMT has used as the basis for its talks with the PRC.
The KMT last week sent a delegation to meet China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao (宋濤). Song reiterated the importance of implementing Xi’s will and completing China’s strategy to resolve “the Taiwan question”, in line with a white paper released last year aiming for unification with Taiwan. The paper does not rule out the use of military force.
Former vice president Lien Chan (連戰), in his memoir published last month, called on Beijing to face up to the existence of the “ROC government,” and said that “only with such political mutual trust can cross-strait dialogue begin.” China criticized him, saying that his emphasis on the ROC was essentially a “two-state theory” implying independence. This should show the KMT that Beijing’s idea of “unification” would mean the end of the ROC.
The idea of “one China” has long been a major cause of antagonism across the Taiwan Strait and rigid diplomatic interactions. However, with more countries realizing Taiwan’s economic and political importance, China’s stranglehold on global diplomacy will hopefully weaken.
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes. A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity,
RSS