On Dec. 9, a new viral video circulated in India showed a clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers on the border of the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian Ministry of Defense reported that its Chinese counterpart is unilaterally trying to change the “status quo” of the border with China through an intrusion in Tawang’s Yangtze area.
The clash eventuated two-and-a-half years after a major clash in Ladakh’s Galwan valley in the west killed about 24 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops.
The Chinese side refuses to share any details.
It is not surprising that this month’s outbreak of violence was instigated by the Chinese side at a time when Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is facing a major backlash and unusual resentment from Chinese because of China’s “zero-COVID-19” policy.
Is this just a Chinese attempt to divert attention from the growing internal resentment against the policy? Or is there a larger concern that needs to be acknowledged by the Indian side?
Sudha Ramachandran, an editor of the South Asia section of The Diplomat magazine, reported that the recent ingression at India’s eastern border did not happen in isolation, and was not due to “fuzziness in the border” or usual minor patrol tension.
Instead, it was an outcome of a “planned attempt” by the Chinese side to take control of a 5,180m peak in the Tawang area, Ramachandran said.
Moreover, it is the third time the Chinese side tried to attack the peak. The previous two intrusions occurred in June and October last year, causing a series of clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers.
Over the past few years, China’s interest in Tawang, as well as Arunachal Pradesh, has become more than a bargaining chip over India’s recognition of the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin, which India claims as part of Ladakh, a gateway for China’s interest in Central Asia.
In addition to the military attacks, the Chinese government in 2017 and in January issued maps and unilaterally announced standardized names for 14 places in Arunachal Pradesh to assert its claims over Indian territory.
Under Xi’s presidency, China has built 354 well-funded border-defense villages as a part of its poverty alleviation program in the Lhokha Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region, which shares a border with Arunachal Pradesh and Bhutan.
In addition to the economic objective, the larger strategic and political objectives of these projects cannot be ignored.
Over the past few years, China has taken assertive actions, indicating that its interest in Arunachal Pradesh is larger than merely a bargaining chip for Aksai Chin.
Such intentions were already suggested by former Chinese state councilor Dai Bingguo (戴秉國), Beijing’s special representative on the boundary issue from 2003 to 2013.
For China, Tawang has been an integral part of Tibet since 1680, when the fifth Dalai Lama sent Merak Lama Lodre Gyatso on a mission to establish the Tawang monastery.
The foundation of the monastery led to the establishment of a direct relationship between the region and the Lhasa government.
The sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, was born in Tawang in 1683 and was a Monpa. He acts as an affirmation that Tawang has historically been an important part of Tibet. It is not solely an important religious and cultural center for Tibetans, but is also an important political symbol of Tibet’s independence.
Ma Jiali (馬加力), a researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a leading Chinese government think tank, argued that Tawang is not just a Tibetan Buddhist town, but also has strategic and political significance to China’s Tibetan affairs.
The prevalence of Tibetan Buddhism in the region and its historical link with Tibet is making China nervous that one part of Tibet is not under Chinese control.
Hypothetically, if the next Dalai Lama is born in Tawang, China’s legitimacy in Tibet could be challenged and it could lose its dominance over Tibetan Buddhism, which continues to be a major obstacle to the establishment of a successful leadership regime in Tibet.
China has been trying to strengthen its grip over Tibetan Buddhism through regulations — for example, the imposition of a new law on the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation.
The Dalai Lama has already made it clear that if Tibet is not free, he will not take rebirth in occupied Tibet. All of the major figures of Tibetan Buddhism have escaped China and are living in exile, except the puppet Panchen Lama selected by the Chinese government.
For the Chinese government, its concern over the political legacy of the region is more than strategic. Securing Tawang is essential to completing the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Tawang is a reminder of China’s unfinished colonial project in Tibet.
Dolma Tsering is a postdoctoral candidate at National Cheng Kung University’s Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences.
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