Predictions are always tricky, especially when they involve the actions of individuals.
Last week, National Security Bureau Director-General Chen Ming-tong (陳明通) said, regarding the formation of the Chinese Communist Party’s new Politburo Standing Committee lineup, that if two or three members were replaced, the policy of “common prosperity, reform and opening up” would endure.
However, if there were a reshuffle of up to four members, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) would have a tighter grip on power than before, Chen said.
The reshuffle showed that Xi has created a new ruling elite stacked with loyalists, suggesting that the political struggle in China was more ferocious than Chen expected.
Dictators are known to be arbitrary and volatile, and should not be expected to behave any other way.
Xi, 69, will be 74 if he finishes his third term. As he has scrapped the presidential two-term limit, it seems he seeks indefinite rule.
By the end of a fourth term, Xi would be an advanced age, but not older than many other dictators through history. As he has already broken the age rule of 68, and considers himself above the new one, Xi seems to be on track to become leader for life, with power rivaling that of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東).
Dictatorships can be efficient through their use of force, giving a false impression of competence.
However, without an opposing force to keep this power in balance, a regime’s policies might only reflect the interests of an elite group and could therefore be biased.
Such a state needs to deploy propaganda or clamp down on freedom of expression to cover up “mishaps” caused by such policies. When mistakes begin to pile up, the nation can fall into decline, and face collapse when a grave policy mistake occurs. The rise and fall of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany are good illustrations.
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, political philosopher Hannah Arendt describes the features and mechanics of totalitarian movements, including the one-party state, monitoring the behavior of its people and subordinates, and implementing large-scale social mobilization through recurring mass movements.
With the establishment of an urban management corps and “big white” health officials wearing hazmat suits to stamp out corruption and impose harsh lockdowns, Xi has concentrated power in the hands of a single man through mass mobilization campaigns.
A dictator’s indefinite rule is not protected by the system. If the original rule is overturned by force, the rule-breaker has to watch out for potential threats. Even if a dictator is universally feared, they can experience anxiety, paranoia and defensiveness.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, its ill-fated campaigns like the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the gruesome deaths of former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi (劉少奇) and former Chinese vice premier Lin Biao (林彪) were all associated with dictator-style rule.
For those outside the regime, it is not possible to know what a dictator embracing lifelong rule would choose as their goal. Would it be to cement a legacy in the history of the party, or to have an iron grip on power?
The former could mean starting a cross-strait war, reclaiming the “lost” territories of the Siberian Stanovoy Range or the island of Sakhalin, while the latter could lead to turbulence and turmoil on the scale of the Cultural Revolution.
Only time will tell what a Chinese dictatorship portends.
HoonTing is a political commentator.
Translated by Rita Wang
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