The local election campaigns are reaching fever pitch. Although the results next month would not affect the governing party, they should be an important bellwether for the political landscape.
They can also provide insight into whether the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has laid to rest the long-running controversy of ill-gotten assets, and show if parties have adopted a democratic spirit and are playing fair.
The elections would lay bare the true colors of the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), as well as their national affiliation and stance on national security.
China and its supporters have adopted covert intimidation tactics, using a visit to Taipei of US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to escalate cross-strait tensions and drive a wedge between Taiwan and the US.
Beijing’s fellow travelers in Taiwan parroted its propaganda by lambasting the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) pro-US policy, spreading rumors about a potential date of a Chinese invasion. This was to boost the KMT’s electoral hopes, accept China’s terms of surrender and accomplish “peaceful unification.”
However, the KMT is in hot water. With its ill-gotten assets confiscated and a dearth of talent, things are not looking rosy for it. As its top brass show lackluster leadership, other members find it difficult to muster the energy to support the party’s agenda.
Without the funds to mobilize local members, its campaigns have been lethargic. Some senior members, such as former premier Simon Chang (張善政), the KMT’s candidate for Taoyuan mayor, sidelined local factions and the people they favored to run. The local factions have given Chang lukewarm support, if not the cold shoulder.
Party heavyweights have faded into the background. Nonetheless, they would have found it problematic to support some candidates, with some of the party’s candidates becoming embroiled in controversies, including KMT Hualien County Commissioner Hsu Chen-wei (徐榛蔚), who has been accused of “hereditary politics” for governing interchangeably with her husband, former Hualien county commissioner Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁); KMT Legislator Hsu Shu-hua (許淑華), the party’s candidate for Nantou County commissioner, who has been accused of plagiarism; and Yilan County Commissioner Lin Zi-miao (林姿妙), who was indicted on charges including corruption, forgery and money laundering.
As volunteer canvassers have failed to connect with local factions or find resonance with supporters due to their pro-China ideology, candidates have been left to look out for each other.
The KMT seeks to retake Taipei and reclaim its traditional stronghold in Taoyuan. It has teamed up with the TPP to attack former minister of health and welfare Chen Shih-chung (陳時中), the DPP’s Taipei mayoral candidate, vilifying his accomplishments in COVID-19 prevention.
The KMT’s ploy in Taoyuan had been to use Chang, who has also been accused of plagiarism, apparently even being paid NT$57.36 million (US$1.8 million) for such work, to oust the DPP’s initial candidate, former Hsinchu mayor Lin Chih-chien (林智堅).
Meanwhile, the TPP introduced two “pseudo party members” as its mayoral candidates in Taipei and Hsinchu. In Taipei, the candidates are waishengren (外省人, referring to people who fled to Taiwan with the KMT in 1949 after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War) — former Taipei deputy mayor Vivian Huang (黃珊珊), an independent candidate, but a former TPP member, and KMT Legislator Chiang Wan-an (蔣萬安) — up against the born-and-bred “local,” Chen.
In Hsinchu, the TPP has put forward Legislator Ann Kao (高虹安), a conceited academic with an elitist complex. The move has created a battle between the DPP and KMT candidates over second place in the polls.
In both cities, the KMT is in for a hard fight, the TPP is seeking to prod hornet’s nests and China is testing its tactics.
Struggling with a shortage of funds and talent, the KMT has resorted to lies to arouse hatred against the DPP. The KMT’s smear campaign has had some success, eliminating DPP and TPP candidates before campaigning had begun.
If the KMT did not have its ill-gotten assets in use, its wheels would be falling off.
James Wang is a media commentator.
Translated by Rita Wang
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