In a campaign tackling wasted government funds on Saturday last week, Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) — who is also the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) chairman — and his team were invited to take part in a shooting game using gel blasters. Ko was filmed taking shelter behind his shield throughout the game — only once poking his head out for a quick look — while his teammates fired freely at the “enemies.”
When interviewed about his “moves” in the game, Ko said that when one enters an unfamiliar environment, the first thing to do is to observe and hold out until the enemy runs out of ammunition.
“By then, it would be my turn to take out the enemy one by one,” he said.
Ko’s behavior in the game triggered a backlash on social media, with many Internet users calling it “cowardly” and “shameful.”
Shen Jung-chin (沈榮欽), an associate professor at York University in Canada, attacked Ko for demonstrating smug self-satisfaction, arrogance and a lack of leadership. He said that had Ko been a political heavyweight in the global community, leaders of other developed countries would have been appalled by his actions and could be misled to think of Taiwan as a selfish nation. He also said he did not dare to think of how Ko would behave in the event of a war.
In the eyes of TPP supporters, Ko’s remarks might have sounded well-planned and rational, befitting a doctor’s insight, but on a deeper level, Ko’s behavior in the game reflected his capricious character and opportunist ideology.
Ko’s apparent cowardice gives the impression of a selfish leader who has no qualms sacrificing his teammates and is only interested in his own survival. Under normal circumstances, leaders would seek to set an example by taking the initiative and sharing the risk of being hit with their people — as evidenced by Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
Ko’s past treatment of his staff reflects his behavior in the game.
From former Taipei City Department of Urban Development commissioner Lin Jou-min (林洲民) to former Taipei City Government secretary-general Su Li-chung (蘇麗瓊), Ko adopts a revolving-door employment scheme — an endless round of firings, forced ousters and harsh critiques of those who work for him. Treating his staff like disposable chopsticks, Ko’s concern is not the realization of an ideal or policy, but his own survival.
As Ko’s tenure comes to an end next month, he might pose an even bigger threat to Taiwan’s political scene. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) probably has no use or patience for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or KMT Chairman Eric Chu’s (朱立倫) mediocre, weak leadership. However, Ko could be seen as the next advocate to help facilitate their plan for unification.
Purporting himself as the descendant of a 228 Incident victim, Ko is popular with young people for his outspokenness and represents a certain degree of pro-localization because of his benshengren (本省人, people who came to Taiwan before World War II) identity. These two groups are the CCP’s main targets.
From his rise to Taipei mayor with pro-Democratic Progressive Party sentiments, to his endorsement of the statement “the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one family,” Ko’s acute shift in political ideology identifies him as someone who could spin on a coin when the situation calls for it. He has the potential to be shaped to the CCP’s liking, as could be seen from his transition from a DPP supporter to a CCP advocate.
In the case of a political chameleon like Ko, perhaps games are no different from reality, as he treats everyone around him as pawns to be sacrificed for his political checkmate.
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