After the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Taiwan policy act (TPA), the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee introduced its own version. The House version restored parts of the Senate version that were deemed controversial and had been deleted.
The gesture was friendly toward Taiwan, but it need not be interpreted as supportive of Taiwanese sovereignty, or cause any turbulence in relations with China. As the TPA’s initiator, US Senator Robert Menendez said that the bill would not change US policy toward Taiwan. Nevertheless, the TPA conveys a more lucid message about the US’ willingness to assist Taiwan.
One of the restored parts is the naming of a Taiwan representative office, which has been debated in other countries since Lithuania established such an office last year. As early as last November, the European Commission said that Lithuania’s approval for a Taiwanese representative office would not go against its “one China” policy.
The US also supported Lithuania on this matter, but when the issue became its own, the US wavered and left Lithuania to endure pressure from China alone. How can that be justified? The American Institute in Taiwan uses the name “Taiwan.”
As for calling Taiwan a “major non-NATO ally,” former US president George W. Bush made Taiwan a de facto non-NATO ally in 2003. The TPA only specifies it through the bill.
The Taiwan Relations Act also changed phrasing of arms sales to take a more deterrence-oriented approach. Some critics believe that the US is to sell offensive weapons to Taiwan, which would agitate Beijing and cause turbulence in the Taiwan Strait.
However, who has hoarded a great number of offensive weapons and threatens Taiwan every day? Would it not be more reasonable that Beijing be asked to stop the menace and its development of offensive weapons?
Under the threat of these offensive weapons, is Taiwan not allowed to possess arms of the same nature to deter China?
As the initiator of the House’s version, US Representative Michael McCaul said: “Deterrence is key to stopping the [Chinese Communist Party] from provoking a conflict that would seriously harm US national security,” and it is important “to arm our ally, before an invasion occurs, not after” — a lesson learned from Ukraine.
Unless China is willing to make a promise that it would not use military force to deal with Taiwan, it is off the mark to discuss whether China would be agitated. In the face of a bully, peace depends on strength, rather than self-limiting compromise and concession.
Former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo recently said that it is China that creates the threat, not Taiwan or the US. Peace is destroyed because China makes every effort to develop its military might and constantly show its intention to use it.
The threatened should not be blamed for doing something that annoys those who threaten. This “victim blaming” logic must not become the mainstream viewpoint regarding the US-Taiwan relationship. It cannot sustain peacekeeping. Instead, it would allow those who make the threats to believe in the effectiveness of military coercion and become more aggressive in seeking what they want.
With the enactment of the TPA, the connections between Taiwan and other democratic countries are justified and supported, and Taiwan’s military strength would be reinforced. This is the most effective way to truly deter China and maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait.
Chen Shih-min is an associate professor in National Taiwan University’s political science department.
Translated by Liu Yi-hung
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