Former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Chen Min-jen (陳明真) recently published an article calling for the government to push back the date for realizing a nuclear-power-free Taiwan from 2025 to 2035.
When Germany implemented a similar policy in 1997, it sought to phase out nuclear power by 2022, Chen said, adding that if Germany envisioned 25 years to reach its goal, it would be reasonable for Taiwan to give itself 19 years to wean itself off nuclear energy.
Taking Taiwan’s situation into account, the nation should realize that postponing the goal is inevitable.
Small and densely populated, Taiwan is no place for nuclear energy. As a result, I supported the DPP’s campaign when the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) vowed to achieve a “nuclear-free homeland” by 2025, and participated in many rallies against nuclear power.
However, the original schedule was based on peacetime conditions; it did not take into account shipping problems, risks of war, or climate or environmental issues. Environmental protests and several black swan events have in the past few years impeded the original schedule, and it is no longer possible to reach the goal in time.
Consequently, the government should adjust the policy and convey the reasons for not being able to meet the deadline to the public. Even though sarcasm and ridicule from opposition parties could be expected, most Taiwanese would understand the government’s plight.
Exploitation and destruction of wildlife and the environment has exceeded the Earth’s tolerance. Extreme climate events are taking place around the world. Severe droughts have led to reduced crop yield and shortage of water for humans and livestock. Deadly rainstorms have caused a great number of casualties and damage to property. Extremely hot weather has fueled huge wildfires around the globe. The melting of glaciers and polar ice caps have greatly affected marine and terrestrial ecosystems. These unforeseen extreme weather events have brought damage and losses to food and electricity supplies.
As Shakespeare wrote: “When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalions.” After Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong (毛澤東), the world now has to deal with power-hungry strongmen such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), who harbor ambitions to conquer the world via overwhelming military force. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered an energy and food crisis, undermining nations’ efforts to achieve net zero carbon emissions.
As possibilities of war brought about unprecedented challenges, Xi’s military drills encircling Taiwan have put a spotlight on energy resource importation.
As sustainable energy has not become a mainstream energy solution in Taiwan, global issues have to be taken into account. Pushing back the date for the nuclear-free homeland policy has become a choice of necessity.
However, as nuclear waste disposal is another issue at hand, solving it would be a precondition for the policy’s adjustment.
Jhang Shih-hsien is a retired researcher.
Translated by Rita Wang
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