Ties between Taiwan and Australia have been improving, especially economically. Taiwan last year became Australia’s seventh-largest export market and its 10th-largest trading partner. Among foreign banks operating in Australia, Taiwanese lenders are more visible than those from other countries.
In February, the Australian government released a report titled Expanding the membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which recommended that Australia cooperate with other CPTPP members to encourage and promote Taiwan’s accession to the bloc, and even advocated talks between Taipei and Canberra on a bilateral free-trade agreement.
The relationship has surpassed conventional fields to include pragmatic support and security considerations, amid Beijing’s perennial provocations toward Taiwan and Australia.
“Friendship” has emerged as a branding of the two sides’ relationship, given their democratic base and shared perceptions of China’s aggression.
In 2020, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) — showing empathy and support for Canberra — encouraged Taiwanese to purchase Australian wine, calling it “freedom wine,” following China’s imposition of high import tariffs. One year later, when China banned pineapple imports from Taiwan, Australia purchased part of the surplus, despite domestic production satisfying its market.
Even ordinary Australians have been more concerned about security across the Taiwan Strait.
A Resolve Political Monitor survey showed that more than two-thirds of respondents said Australia should do “something” if China were to launch an attack against Taiwan.
“Something” included trade and economic sanctions, and diplomatic and military action.
Australia, a long-term ally of the US, has been targeted by China. Against the backdrop of the US-China strategic rivalry, Canberra’s relations with Beijing have deteriorated rapidly.
Citing various grounds, China has imposed restrictions and embargoes on imports of Australian agricultural products, seafood and coal.
The China Daily has warned Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor, Scott Morrison, saying this would come “at the cost of the whole region.”
Chinese Ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian (肖千) has called for “concrete action” to “reset” the China-Australia relationship, but Albanese has been blunt about his stance, saying: “What I have said, and we maintain, is that the relationship with China will remain a difficult one.”
Albanese also said that “it is China that has changed, not Australia, and Australia should always stand up for our values, and we will do so in a government that I lead.”
Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last month, Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles voiced concern over China’s military buildup, and urged Beijing to make assurances and act with transparency on cross-strait issues, calling those moves crucial for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
However, as Australia-China relations are worsening, a radical shift in Canberra’s China policy is unlikely to take place under Albanese’s administration. Canberra is unlikely to stop looking to Washington in regulating its relations with Beijing.
Since 2017, Australia has shifted its approach to China due to concerns over Beijing’s increasingly assertive diplomacy and intensifying US-China competition, making a neutral stance nearly impossible.
Australia has become a founding member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), reinforcing the relationship between Canberra and Washington, and making closer collaboration possible.
However, it would not be surprising if Albanese’s administration was less outspoken than Morrison’s regarding Taiwan. As Taiwan-friendly policies were mainly driven by Morrison and then-Australian minister for defence Peter Dutton, the debate is likely assume softer tones with the change in administration.
With the rapid pace of geopolitical and strategic change, security in the Indo-Pacific region has become more critical.
It has become evident that China dominating the region would bring about a deteriorating balance of power.
Although a crisis in the Taiwan Strait would only lead to a catastrophic future that regional democracies, including Australia, do not wish to imagine, it is not an impossibility.
A report on China’s military capacity released in November last year by the US Department of Defense said that Beijing “is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC [People’s Republic of China] by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying or denying any third-party intervention, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf.”
Australia needs astute preparations in case of uncertainties “to withstand some tough military shocks,” said Peter Jennings, a senior fellow of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, adding that Australia’s engagement is necessary because Canberra’s security “matters to friends and allies.”
Australia should prioritize its long-term objective of upholding a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region, where Canberra has interests and a responsibility to support like-minded countries. Hence, bolstering deterrence would likely be the best option to deter China’s military adventurism against Taiwan.
A middle power such as Australia could embrace middle-power diplomacy by fostering multilateralism, an appealing strategy that could, to some extent, prevent rivalry veering into conflict or even war.
Moreover, concerted efforts could bolster Australia’s credibility as a traditional middle power and an important player in the region.
Australia is a member of various regional security mechanisms, including the 1951 ANZUS, a collective security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the US; the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising Australia, the US, Japan and India; the Five Eyes, an intelligence-sharing alliance between the US, the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand; and, most recently, AUKUS, a security and technology pact between Australia, the UK and the US.
The participation of Australia in security pacts has demonstrated Canberra’s important role in the Indo-Pacific landscape.
As a vital member of regional security pacts, Australia should work closely with other democratic states to clarify their objectives and implement policies against Chinese malign behavior in cybersecurity; information warfare, which is regarded as important for Australia’s security; and interoperability.
A Quad meeting in May did not tackle these aspects, but kept its focus on maritime security. It is time that leading powers seek viable policies to bolster the regional democratic alignment.
Given its growing profile in the regional security structure, Australia should forge ties with the US, Japan, South Korea and India to include Taiwan in regional forums and collaborative mechanisms, such as maritime cooperation, climate change adaptation and energy security.
Encouraging like-minded nations toward multilateralism could warn China that a reckless approach toward Taiwan could also aggravate its partners and friends.
Australia is clear on two factors: China has not sought to paper over its authoritarian ambition toward and coercion of Taiwan, and Australia’s overall view of the coercive rise of Beijing has darkened.
For Albanese, determined support for Taiwan likely depends on China’s activities, which have demonstrated an Orwellian repression of its populace and a bid to reshape the regional order.
Huynh Tam Sang is an international relations lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities. Chen Kuan-ting is CEO of the Taiwan NextGen Foundation.
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