In the past few years, especially after the 2017 Chinese Communist Party national congress, there have been disturbing signals that China is reconsidering its peaceful approach to Taiwan and taking steps toward armed unification.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has repeatedly called for complete national “reunification” as an inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
Xi in 2019 dropped the term “peaceful” when referring to unification with Taiwan, but included it again last year.
China could possibly attempt an invasion before Aug. 1, 2027, the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but there remain unanswered questions about the capabilities of China’s amphibious assault units and airborne troops.
Taiwan knows the mammoth challenge it faces and has begun to upgrade its defensive capabilities, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created new discussions over deterrence, defense planning and preparedness, weapons, military tactics and contingencies.
Moreover, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has instructed the National Security Council to create a task force on Ukraine to monitor developments and the possible impact on Taiwan’s security.
I have had the privilege of speaking with officials working closely on Taiwan’s national security issues. My biggest takeaway from these conversations was that, unlike multiple recent analyses only focusing on military and tactical lessons from the Russian invasion, Taiwan has also taken on board unconventional contingency planning lessons along with conventional military tactical lessons from the ongoing conflict. It is taking steps toward not only deterring China and defending its territory, but also planning civilian contingencies in the event of a protracted war.
The first major lesson that Taiwan has learned from the Ukraine conflict is about maintaining the nation’s supply of food.
The Russian-Ukraine war has also been termed a war between two agricultural powerhouses. During the course of the war, Russia has, on multiple occasions, moved to cripple Ukraine’s agrarian economy by targeting agriculture infrastructure — fields, farm equipment, warehouses, markets, roads, bridges and ports. It aims to cripple Ukraine’s major source of income and also cause domestic unrest due to food shortages and rising inflation.
Taiwan is not an agricultural economy. It is heavily dependent on imported food and agricultural products due to limited arable land and a small agricultural sector. Its food security would be severely affected if China were to implement maritime and air blockades. Thus, a major lesson that the administration has drawn from the ongoing crisis is to expand food storage facilities, plan for contingencies and diversify supply routes.
Like food security, energy storage and security is another important area for Taiwan to improve on.
In the initial stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russian troops blew up a gas pipeline near Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city. Then Russia claimed to have taken control of the area surrounding Europe’s largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia.
It also attempted to shut down Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, causing limited disruptions.
All these highlight the need to preserve and support critical energy infrastructure, from power plants and power grids to oil and gas pipelines, and from conventional to smart or hybrid warfare.
Taiwan is not new to smart warfare, being a major victim of Chinese cyberattacks. Taiwan’s information security and protection center reportedly detected and handled about 1.4 billion “anomalies” from January 2019 to August last year.
However, the lessons of the war in Ukraine are compelling Taiwan to comprehensively re-examine its cybersecurity, and energy security and storage at a national level.
Finally, civilian mobilization during a crisis is a crucial area for Taiwan to focus on.
As the Ukrainian armed forces resisted the Russian invasion, ordinary Ukrainians contributed in multiple ways: blocking incoming Russian units, protesting in Russian-occupied cities, throwing objects at Russian tanks and drones, and even picking up a gun to defend the nation if needed.
Civilian mobilization and resistance has contributed immensely to avoiding a Russian blitzkrieg, turning the invasion into a protracted conflict.
It is an important lesson for Taiwan, which struggles to recruit soldiers for its armed forces. In Taiwan, there are not enough troops to operate its tanks, armored units, mechanized infantry and artillery units, even though they are the first line of defense against a potential PLA invasion.
Taiwan is making efforts on quantitative and qualitative recruitment of troops, but there are better economic opportunities for young people. To compensate, Taiwan is sending more non-commissioned officers to the US to observe and train with their US counterparts to boost joint operational capabilities.
However, it is aware that the non-commissioned officers are no substitute for qualitative and quantitative improvements in the armed forces, and it is taking steps to enhance its recruitment drive.
Other lessons of the conflict in Ukraine are improving asymmetric warfare capabilities, use of diplomatic and economic statecraft, and creating a firewall against China’s psychological and media warfare during an invasion.
These lessons are extremely important to help ensure the safety and security of Taiwanese during an armed Chinese unification campaign.
Suyash Desai is a researcher specializing in Chinese security and foreign policies. He is studying Mandarin at National Sun Yat-sen University.
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