On May 5, the US Department of State made major changes to the US-Taiwan relations fact sheet on its Web site. It removed statements in the previous text that said it acknowledges Beijing’s “one China” position, and that the US does not support Taiwanese independence. Triggering wide debate, this update is a follow-up to the speech outlining US policy toward China delivered by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed and expressed its appreciation for the update, and reiterated Taiwan’s position on working with countries that share similar values to safeguard a rules-based international order. The changes have drawn fire from Beijing, which described the US’ move as “a petty act of fictionalizing and hollowing out the ‘one China’ principle.”
The fact sheet points to a significant warming in relations between the US and Taiwan, and Washington’s plans to put more emphasis on bilateral diplomatic interaction in due course.
Under the administration of former US president Donald Trump, US policy on relations with Taiwan has become more well-elucidated and transparent. China has become the US’ biggest rival since the start of a trade war. As COVID-19 spread from Wuhan, China, to countries around the globe, Beijing has stepped up military provocations in the Indo-Pacific region.
As a nation on the front line of authoritarian expansion, Taiwan occupies a strategic position in the first island chain. Commenting on Taiwan’s strategic value, the late US general Douglas MacArthur described Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”
Under the Trump administration, US arms sales to Taiwan, in terms of quality and quantity, reached a new high. It also declassified former US president Ronald Reagan’s “six assurances” to Taiwan to reaffirm a long-term and robust bilateral security relationship.
Following then-US secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s lifting of all restrictions on exchanges with Taiwan, Cabinet-level officials have successively visited Taiwan. Although the state department had not yet updated the fact sheet at the time, the US’ “one China policy” already differed widely from Beijing’s “one China principle.”
After switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, Washington’s policy on US-Taiwan relations has always worked under the context of US-China diplomatic relations. That allowed Beijing to ramp up political pressure on Taipei while pulling the wool over the eyes of the global community.
Whenever there were meetings between the US and Chinese officials, Beijing would jump at every opportunity to use its state media to amplify the propaganda that Washington “does not support Taiwanese independence,” even when no such thing was mentioned in the meeting. Taiwan’s pursuit of democratic progress was stigmatized as undermining regional peace — an act that “both the US and China do not wish to see.”
In Taiwan, pro-China supporters followed China’s lead in obstructing Taiwan’s aspiration of reinforcing democracy.
After US President Joe Biden took office, Washington continued with its hawkish anti-China policy, while Beijing, sticking to form, kept trying to put words in the US’ mouth. On the evening of March 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習進平) had a videoconference with Biden.
According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Biden “reiterated the commitments” he made with Xi last year: that the US does not seek a new cold war with China; it does not aim to change China’s system; the revitalization of the US’ alliances is not targeted at China; the US does not support “Taiwanese independence”; and it has no intention to seek conflict with China.
Beijing-friendly politicians and media started lambasting President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) government, trying their best to drive a wedge between Taiwan and the US, and support the Chinese Communist Party in its cognitive warfare against Taiwan.
The state department’s update on US-Taiwan relations — with the removal of “the US does not support Taiwanese independence” — is not only a slap in Beijing’s face, but also highlights that there were never any “commitments” to China.
If the US wishes to seek closer ties with Taiwan, it does not need to take China into account for policies regarding Taiwan or Taiwanese independence, nor does it have an obligation to make commitments to China. The gaping difference between the US’ “one China policy” and China’s “one China principle” does not leave space for Beijing to exploit.
Similarly, on April 20, after US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s call with Chinese Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe (魏鳳和), Beijing published a readout of its own which claimed that the US adheres to the “one China principle.”
Pentagon press secretary John Kirby rejected this by specifically and clearly stating in a press conference that is just “not true.” The US embassy in Beijing also posted news of Kirby’s clarification on its Twitter account in simplified Chinese.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) said that he was glad to see the US come out and break “the routine of the People’s Republic of China’s ‘one China’ principle spell.”
From the two acts by the US’ state and defense departments, it is apparent that Washington is no longer giving Beijing the opportunity to play word games. The US meant to show the global community that the “one China” policy it has been implementing is based on the two cornerstones of the Taiwan Relations Act and the “six assurances,” with the goal of strengthening Taiwan’s vibrant democracy and deterring Beijing from using the “one China” principle to annex Taiwan.
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of San Francisco. The US-led treaty did not stipulate Taiwan’s sovereignty, nor which government would take over, which constituted the long-term foundation of the US-Taiwan relations policy.
The US has, on multiple occasions, publicly said that its “one China policy” is different from Beijing’s “one China principle,” and has encouraged other democratic countries to form closer ties with Taiwan. Instead of regarding this policy as a “one China policy,” its nature may be closer to a “one Taiwan policy.” The strategic goal is for a democratic Taiwan to be beyond the clutches of authoritarian China.
The global community has seen that the US has used more positive narratives to define US-Taiwan relations in the new fact sheet. For example, it now opens with: “As a leading democracy and technological powerhouse, Taiwan is a key US partner in the Indo-Pacific.” In other words, the robust relationship between the two nations has nothing to do with China, but is founded on Taiwan’s own unique values.
Given the US’ explicit stance, pro-China supporters in Taiwan had found it more difficult to obfuscate or distort the “one China” policy. Instead, they had to resort to threat by claiming that US’ support of Taiwan would provoke Beijing and escalate tensions between Taiwan and China.
The “one China” policy has always been about preventing Beijing from taking actions to make unilateral changes to the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. Any distortion of the “one China” policy or false reasonings are but attempts to undermine confidence in Taiwan-US relations and weaken Washington’s support for Taipei, clearing the way for Beijing to take Taiwan by force.
Translated by Rita Wang
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