The security pact sealed between China and the Solomon Islands on Tuesday last week has been both controversial and dangerous, as it indicates a new front in Beijing’s power play that could set off geopolitical shock waves, not only in Canberra, Wellington and Washington, but also in Taipei.
The rising concerns emanating from the pact are easy to understand. Beijing’s long-term strategy of stepping up dollar diplomacy and wooing politicians in the Solomon Islands threatens to strengthen its foothold “in an island chain that played a decisive role in World War II and could be used to block vital shipping lanes,” Damien Cave wrote in the New York Times.
Small and impoverished, most countries in the region are susceptible to Beijing’s charm offensive. However, this vague security deal could have a spillover effect on democratic nations that are locked in a tense relationship with China.
The pact has sparked concerns in Washington and could further intensify tensions between the US and China. US President Joe Biden’s administration has voiced concern over “the lack of transparency and unspecified nature” of the security agreement, which was hailed by Beijing as a major step to promote regional stability and runs “parallel and complementary” to its close ties with the Solomons.
Such diplomatic courting from China also stoked fears in Australia and New Zealand, as it has put a check on the two middling powers’ room to maneuver. Beijing could deploy military forces to Honiara, not ruling out stationing a naval base in the Solomons to maintain “social order” if requested by the small Pacific island nation.
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called the pact “a threat” to Canberra’s national security, while Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne said she was “deeply disappointed” about the deal. New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern questioned the motive of the security arrangement and flagged Beijing’s “growing assertiveness” in the Pacific region.
As a former diplomatic ally of Taiwan, the Solomon Islands’ security deal with China should also be watched cautiously by President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration.
Losing diplomatic allies has been one of this administration’s lingering concerns. Taiwan has worked strenuously to cement ties with its official allies. However, Taiwan’s humanitarian support to its allies has lagged behind the vast quantities of Chinese capital that has poured into the region and is designed to woo Pacific island nations into supporting China diplomatically.
Three years ago, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands switched recognition from Taiwan to China due to Beijing’s dollar diplomacy. In the Pacific, Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with four allies — the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu — but the combined populations of the four nations are smaller than that of the former British colony.
With a view to retaining diplomatic relations with its four remaining Pacific allies, the Tsai administration has been resolute in engaging with these nations. In 2019, Tsai visited Palau, Nauru and the Marshall Islands amid simmering tensions with China. Taiwan also provided medical funds to its allies and supported them in areas such as clean energy, infrastructure, maritime safety and disease prevention.
At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan started its “mask diplomacy” by donating 80,000 masks, ventilators, test kits and other epidemic prevention materials to its four Pacific allies under the banner of “Taiwan Can Help, and Taiwan is Helping.”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Joanne Ou (歐江安) has said that Taiwan and its democratic allies are seriously concerned about the security pact, adding that the agreement “destroys the status quo and the supply chain of democratic allies, and endangers regional peace and stability.”
For Pacific nations, the security deal is truly a strategic nightmare in the sense that it could put the territories of these nations within the orbit of a future military assault by China. In the foreseeable future, China’s mounting encroachment in the Pacific could place an enduring burden on the security of Taipei’s allies, with China’s potential deployment of paramilitary personnel, soldiers and even naval ships to the Solomon Islands.
Taiwan’s diplomatic allies could have perceived geopolitical pressure following the aftershock of the China-Solomon Islands security deal. With China expanding its military presence in the Pacific, these relatively small nations will likely face more intimidating actions from Beijing, which continues to try to lure Taiwan’s diplomatic allies into cutting ties with Taipei.
At this critical juncture, the Tsai administration should be intellectually coherent in its strategy of strengthening ties with Pacific allies. Tsai should make an official visit to its four Pacific allies to enhance Taiwan’s determination to keep up the momentum of bilateral ties.
Washington’s absence from the Solomon Islands for almost 30 years left a power vacuum for Beijing to fill. Hence, Taiwan should not take its eye off the ball. But what can Taiwan pitch to its Pacific allies?
Taiwan could take the initiative to launch high-level dialogues on a quarterly basis to exchange views on strategies to address common and pressing issues, such as digital transformation, cybersecurity, promotion of social equity, public health development, and democratic consolidation. A “minilateral” mechanism utilized for enhancing ties is within reach, should Taiwan adopt a more proactive stance.
Capacity-building, experience sharing, information exchange and joint actions could help foster mutual understanding and equip Pacific island nations with the necessary preparations to deal with future crises.
With Chinese aggression on the rise, Taiwan should stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pacific island states, similar to the way in which the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and G7 countries have supported Taipei. Underlining shared values, such as democracy and human rights, in contrast to China, should be prioritized.
Another policy that the Tsai administration should proceed with is adopting a 3R approach, that is, “reviewing, re-evaluating and revamping” Taiwan’s engagement with Pacific island nations. The New Southbound Policy — Tsai’s flagship foreign policy initiative — was unveiled in 2016 to enhance Taiwan’s economic, diplomatic and people-to-people ties with Indo-Pacific partners. However, Taiwan’s four Pacific allies have been missing from Taipei’s grand strategy.
With the New Southbound Policy 2.0 set to be implemented later this year, it is high time that the government incorporated its four Pacific allies into its comprehensive approach toward the Indo-Pacific region.
Recognizing these four nations on a par with its current New Southbound Policy partners like Australia and New Zealand would indicate that Taiwan is serious and active in bolstering ties with these Pacific nations. Given the heightened geopolitical anxiety in the Pacific, deepening and expanding relations with its diplomatic allies would be a timely and strategic show of support to all of Taiwan’s allies.
As a responsible stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan should bolster ties with like-minded countries, ranging from great to middling powers, and needs to be more proactive in speaking out against China’s economic and military expansion in the Pacific, given its undoubtedly greater presence in the region.
If Taiwan is serious about strengthening ties with its Pacific allies, it should include them in its comprehensive strategy, including diplomatic discourse, foreign policy agendas and the New Southbond Policy 2.0. Omnidirectional cooperation is the only viable way for Taiwan and Pacific nations to maneuver amid China’s growing might.
Huynh Tam Sang, an international relations lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, is a research fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation and nonresident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum.
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