The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has not ruled out cooperating with other opposition parties in the local elections in November, especially in districts that are difficult to win, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) said on Friday. The KMT might not even nominate a mayoral candidate in Kaohsiung, he added.
Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who is chairman of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), said he had not talked to Chu about the issue, and that the scope of the KMT’s intended cooperation remains unclear.
Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康), a prominent KMT member, a day earlier wrote on Facebook that he was inspired by the result of South Korea’s presidential election on Wednesday, citing a candidate who dropped out of the race to endorse the candidate who went on to win. Taiwan’s opposition parties should also unite and “remove” the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), he said, adding that defeating the DPP would be more important than individual opposition parties’ gains.
Since a political party affiliation poll in October last year for the first time showed the TPP, at 17.6 percent, ahead of the KMT, at 16.2 percent, trailing the DPP at 27.1 percent, KMT members have been calling on their party to join forces with the TPP.
Former KMT vice chairman Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) last month urged his party and the TPP to cooperate in November, as the TPP’s potential candidate in the capital, Taipei Deputy Mayor Vivian Huang (黃珊珊), might spoil KMT Legislator Chiang Wan-an’s (蔣萬安), chances of winning if she also ran.
However, Huang said the KMT only sees its own benefit when calling for cooperation with the TPP, adding that the KMT would have won Taipei’s most recent local election if it had done a better job.
A poll released last week showed Chiang 1 percentage point ahead of the DPP’s potential candidate, Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung (陳時中), while Huang was 6 to 7 percentage points behind. It also showed that 52.1 percent of respondents said the KMT and TPP should have their own candidates, while 25.9 percent favored a joint candidate.
Chiang on Friday dismissed the idea of KMT-TPP cooperation, saying that the public might see it as a quid pro quo and it could lead to a decline in support for both parties.
KMT Legisator Fu Kun-chi on Thursday also ruled out cooperating with the TPP, saying that his party would nominate candidates in all districts, including in DPP strongholds in the south. Fu said Ko cooperated with the DPP ahead of his 2014 election victory, when Ko described his political stance as “deep-green,” and the TPP still regularly voted with the DPP in the legislature.
Cooperation with the DPP ended before Ko’s re-election in 2018, and his more recent remarks, including that the “two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait are one family,” suggest he has moved closer to the KMT.
The four items promoted by the KMT lost in a referendum in December last year, its candidate lost a by-election in Taichung’s second electoral district in January and it failed in its campaign to recall independent Legislator Freddy Lim (林昶佐) in Taipei. Showing signs of internal disagreement, the KMT might doubt that it can win on its own, but the TPP seems uninterested in helping. Calls for unity within the KMT have not stopped the infighting over leadership roles and political positions.
Recent polls show the TPP gaining support, but it remains to be seen whether that will translate into votes in November. Ko continuing to play a central role in his party, despite having ambiguous positions on policies including Taiwan’s international relations, might weigh on the TPP.
The KMT and the TPP might need to develop clearer positions before they can see whether they can cooperate. Wanting to “remove the DPP” might be the only consensus they can find.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something