After the first day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it appeared as if the conflict would be a net-positive for the Chinese Communist Party with regard to its territorial designs on Taiwan. Like an attack dog, Russian President Vladimir Putin had torn a chunk out of Pax Americana. Putin’s calculation that Western powers would not intervene directly, for fear of escalating the conflict into a nuclear war, proved correct. Furthermore, the invasion promised to distract Washington and the US military for years to come.
However, nearly two weeks into the war, Putin’s Ukraine gambit appears increasingly unfavorable to Beijing. The unexpectedly harsh global sanctions against Russia would have caught Beijing off-guard. Worse still, explicit parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan are being drawn.
Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has called on Washington to end its policy of strategic ambiguity over Taiwan and urged Japan to host US nuclear weapons. Far from paving the way for China’s annexation of Taiwan, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized democracies around the world and shone a spotlight on Chinese revanchism, in particular its rapacious designs on Taiwan.
While the severe economic and diplomatic ramifications of Putin’s military campaign are causing consternation in Beijing, it is the military aspect of the invasion that should be giving Chinese leaders the heebie-jeebies.
Putin and his generals settled upon the most ambitious invasion strategy available: a multi-pronged, short, sharp “decapitation” attack to quickly overwhelm the Ukrainian government and capture the capital, Kyiv. The initial assault consisted of a standoff air attack: Waves of ballistic and cruise missiles rained down on key military installations. This was followed by bombing raids by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter gunships. Elite Spetsnaz special forces landed at Antonov Airport on the outskirts of Kyiv in an audacious attempt to seize strategic ground, enter Kyiv and decapitate the government. Meanwhile, ground forces crossed the Ukraine border and advanced on three fronts.
Publications by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on how it would approach an invasion of Taiwan mirror almost exactly Russia’s tactics in Ukraine: an initial bombardment by ballistic and cruise missiles to disable key military infrastructure, followed by waves of bombing raids to pummel Taiwan’s defenses. Meanwhile, pre-positioned special forces teams would conduct a “decapitation attack” on the Presidential Office, and a massive amphibious invasion force would cross the Taiwan Strait and land assault troops on Taiwan’s beaches. One retired high-ranking PLA general predicted that the campaign for Taiwan could be wrapped up in as little as 72 hours.
Unfortunately for Beijing, despite the Russian military’s overwhelming numerical advantage and technical superiority, its blitzkrieg strategy is in tatters and its military, unable to make a breakthrough, has been forced to resort to medieval-style siege tactics. Russia might eventually take Kyiv, but at what cost? Putin would have to reduce it to rubble.
The mounting costs of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — economic, military, human and reputational — must be giving Beijing pause for thought. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be far more complex, costly and difficult to pull off than Russia’s “border hop” into Ukraine.
Ukrainians’ belligerent defense of their nation has also given many Taiwanese — and, crucially, the military — inspiration and a morale boost. Ukrainians have demonstrated that it is possible for a smaller power with an inferior military to inflict substantial damage on a larger, more technically sophisticated invading force by employing superior tactics, asymmetric warfare, and savvy information and psychological warfare.
Ukraine might eventually fall to Russia, but Moscow is facing the prospect of a decades-long insurgency. By the same token, China might be able to eventually grind down Taiwan’s military, but at what cost? Beijing might be able to win the war, but could it win the peace? This question should haunt Chinese leaders and its generals.
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