As the Ukraine crisis continues to intensify, the concept of “Finlandization” has been resurrected as a potential compromise for eastern Europe.
The concept refers to smaller countries refraining from policies that oppose an adversarial neighbor while nominally retaining independence, such as Finland did toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. French President Emmanuel Macron last month reportedly suggested that the Finlandization of Ukraine would be “one of the models on the table” for defusing tensions with Russia.
Drawing a comparison between Taiwan and Ukraine, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Taipei City Councilor Hsu Chiao-hsin (徐巧芯) raised the idea on a political talk show, suggesting that Taiwan could learn from Finland’s stance during the Cold War.
Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) has also said that as a small country, Taiwan should keep its head down and avoid provoking China to avoid the same fate as Ukraine, evoking the concept without mentioning it explicitly.
However, the Finlandization of Taiwan should never be considered as a possible solution to cross-strait tensions, as it entails excessive uncertainty and the factual loss of sovereignty.
The nation should instead boost its military prowess and avoid relying too much on other countries fulfilling their promises and treaties toward it. It should not be forgotten that Moscow only consented to Helsinki’s Finlandization policies after the country in World War II proved to be tough nut to crack.
If Taiwan does not display the will and capability to fight, it could not stand a chance of keeping its bellicose neighbor at bay, let alone gain support from the international community.
The Finlandization of Taiwan might seem to be a win-win solution for solving tensions between Taiwan, the US and China. For the US, it would mean being relieved of the burden of keeping regional peace in East Asia; for China, it would mean being able to exert more influence on Taiwan’s foreign policy and military; and for Taiwan, it would be an opportunity to maintain the “status quo” without the constant threat of warfare.
Nevertheless, for the model to work, all parties involved need to reach a consensus and act on it.
Beijing, adhering to its “one China” principle, will never accept the existence of another government claiming to be “Chinese,” let alone respect its independence. China’s flagrant breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and its clampdown on Hong Kong’s democracy movement has demonstrated its unwillingness to abide by rules that no longer suit Beijing.
The US would lose its regional influence and Taiwan as an essential ally in the Asia-Pacific region, opening the gate for China’s aggression.
For Taiwan, Finlandization would be more than just simple foreign policy; it would undermine its sovereignty and affect national identity. With the public increasingly self-identifying as Taiwanese, conceding to China, whether in ideology or foreign policy, would be met with firm public opposition, especially if it erodes the two values that Taiwanese are most proud of: freedom and democracy.
If Taiwan were to go down the path of Finlandization, it would essentially agree to become a second Hong Kong, throwing away the national security and diplomatic foundations it has developed with the US.
To use the Latin adage, “Si vis pacem, para bellum” — “If you want peace, prepare for war.”
Taiwan must enhance its national strength. Any other solution would be a compromise of its integrity and values.
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