Much attention has been given to whether certain cities and counties should be upgraded to special municipalities. The discussion has centered on which cities or counties would be the most appropriate for an upgrade, and whether a current city or county leader could be elected its mayor.
This talk strays from whether the upgrade is necessary. Debate over the creation of a special municipality should center on what role it would play in Taiwan’s regional development.
Taipei has been Taiwan’s economic and political center for decades, and this has caused an imbalance in the nation’s regional development. The government should examine this problem anew, and use the special municipality discussion as an opportunity to talk about how best to utilize public transport infrastructure such as the highways, the high-speed rail and MRT systems — how they operate and serve in the network of industrial zones, science parks, ports and airports.
The government should reconsider the strategic arrangement of each special municipality within the context of the entire country to prevent a waste of resources. It should also use this opportunity to relocate government institutions and facilities, to evaluate which ones would serve the public better elsewhere, and use these institutions and the civil servants living in the cities as the driver for improvements to infrastructure.
For example, the Presidential Office and the president’s official residence could be relocated to Taipei’s Dazhi (大直) area, where they would be closer to military installations that provide protection as needed, while being situated in a less conspicuous location.
The Council of Agriculture could be moved to a rural area where it would better serve the people it represents. Candidates could be Changhua or Yunlin, following an upgrade to special municipality status. The Executive Yuan could be located near a high-speed rail station, making it more convenient for legislators and ministers who must travel frequently for meetings or committees.
Special municipalities with ports and international airports could become centers of economic development for international trade and exchange, acting as regional economic capitals, with Taichung being responsible for central Taiwan and Kaohsiung for southern Taiwan.
Both of these locations are well suited for the role. Taichung is the city closest to China, ideal for trade and economic activity across the Strait, while Kaohsiung is perfectly situated for trade with the Indo-Pacific region and to fulfill the goals of the New Southbound Policy.
As special municipalities, they would be excellent locations for the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
Consolidating government functions and balancing regional development would allow special municipalities to contribute to Taiwan’s development in distinct ways and stimulate Taiwan’s development.
The nation has an opportunity to reassess its long-term growth strategies. Becoming mired in political gamesmanship over the special municipalities issue could be detrimental.
Liu Chao-lung is an associate professor at National Changhua University of Education’s Department of Public Affairs and Civic Education.
Translated by Michelle Mitchell
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