New Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on Oct. 14 dissolved the lower house of parliament and announced that a general election is to be held on Sunday. The early dissolution of the House of Representatives set a new record as the shortest since World War II — it took place only 10 days after Kishida took office, and a mere 10 days after a new Cabinet was formed. Unless something unexpected happens, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s largest political party, is expected to win the election and remain in power.
Japan is a multiparty democracy. It is ruled by the center-right LDP, and the biggest opposition party is the center-left Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP). Despite sitting on opposite ends of the political spectrum, the two major parties hold the same views and strongly agree on national security issues, such as supporting Taiwan’s security and opposing the Chinese threat.
On Oct. 11, Kishida told parliament that Taiwan is an important partner, and that Japan would seek to deepen bilateral relations and continue to pay close attention to the situation around Taiwan. He added that Japan and Taiwan share the same basic values, and that they maintain close economic relations and personnel exchanges.
That same day, CDP leader Yukio Edano told parliament that Taiwan is close to Japan not only geographically, but also in terms of economics, and that it is strategically important for Japan to secure maritime routes. Edano made it clear that he attaches great importance to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and that he opposes Chinese use of force to change the “status quo.”
These comments make it clear that Japan’s opposition parties are rational, and would support important government policies for the sake of national security and interests.
The rapid expansion of Chinese military power in the South China Sea and the frequent live-fire exercises conducted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army near the Taiwan Strait have caused anxiety among Japan’s ruling and opposition parties. To guard against the military threat China poses, the Japanese government has continued to strengthen military preparations and promote national defense education for the general public.
Aside from releasing this year’s edition of the Defense of Japan annual white paper in July, the Japanese government in August published for the first time a children’s edition of the white paper to make it easier for the younger generation to understand the security environment around Japan, its national defense and the current state of China’s military development.
Moreover, to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, the LDP on Oct. 12 unveiled its manifesto before the House of Representatives, which includes a plan to double the nation’s defense expenditure.
According to the manifesto, the goal of the substantial increase in the defense budget is to exceed 2 percent of GDP. This would be equivalent to the proportion of the national defense budget that NATO requires of its member countries. It also means that the political tradition that Japan’s defense expenditure should account for 1 percent of GDP would be changed. The annual budget proposed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense for next year is about US$50 billion.
Although the Chinese military threat is less severe to Japan than it is to Taiwan, Japan’s ruling and opposition parties are all highly alert to issues concerning national security, and Tokyo is willing to allocate a large budget to strengthen its armed forces. This spirit of consensus between the ruling and opposition parties on defense actions is something that Taiwan should learn from.
Yao Chung-yuan is an adjunct university professor and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s Strategic Planning Department.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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