In a close contest, former New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) on Saturday last week was elected Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman for a second time. Many people wonder what the result of this internecine KMT power struggle means for Taiwanese politics — if Chu fails to get a firm grasp of the situation, he might inadvertently help the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secure a third term in office.
The day after the election, Chu received a congratulatory telegram from Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Chu replied, thanking Xi as the two return to acknowledging the so-called “1992 consensus” and opposition to Taiwanese independence. This shows that when Chu called his rival for the chairperson seat, Sun Yat-sen School president Chang Ya-chung (張亞中), a “red unification” candidate who would turn the KMT into a “little red” cheerleader for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it was nothing more than internal conflict during a particularly acrimonious party leadership campaign — perhaps Chu was also trying to get Beijing’s attention.
However, Chu’s support base is weaker than even outgoing KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang’s (江啟臣) was when he took over the reins last year. Moreover, in less than 24 hours, Chu was “reined in” by Beijing, showing that his political abilities have not evolved since his defeat in the 2016 presidential election. It was pure irony when he said right after his win: “It is time for the DPP to start worrying.”
Xi’s congratulatory message conveyed two important points.
First, it affirmed the political basis for cooperation between the KMT and the CCP, which was approved by Xi during a Chu-Xi meeting in China in 2015.
Second, Xi said that the two parties must work together to further the goal of national unification and rejuvenation. Xi was signaling to Chu that he expects the KMT, under Chu’s leadership, to push for “rapid unification.” If not an explicit order, Xi was expressing an expectation.
Chu’s reply to Xi was critically important. First, he took an axe to Chiang’s reformist policies. He attributed the cause of the “precipitous cross-strait situation” to the DPP’s “desinicization and anti-China policies,” and said it is the DPP that has changed the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. Chu is thus endorsing and providing political legitimacy to the CCP’s bullying of Taiwan.
Second, Chu echoed Xi’s phrase “all Chinese sons and daughters” by saying that “the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are the descendants of the Fiery Emperor and the Yellow Emperor.” Next, he recited the familiar incantations of the so-called “1992 consensus” and opposition to Taiwanese independence.
Chu’s choice of words clearly shows that the KMT and the CCP are a united front, working hand-in-glove to attack their mutual enemy, the DPP.
Chu ended his telegram with abject capitulation, replacing the Republic of China calendar date format in his sign off with a People’s Republic of China-endorsed Gregorian calendar date. It was a gesture of unfettered devotion to his master in Beijing.
Chu’s overt mirroring of Xi’s language is particularly telling. Although the DPP immediately sent flowers and a message of congratulations to Chu following his election, Chu waited for Xi’s written instructions before offloading on the DPP. It is an incriminating timeline.
Chang, who lost out to Chu, is at least honest about his intentions. Chu, on the other hand, comes across as dishonest and crafty: These are unappealing character traits. The DPP will likely not be losing much sleep over Chu’s chairmanship of the KMT; it might, in fact, be rather pleased.
Tzou Jiing-wen is the editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper).
Translated by Edward Jones
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