Numbering in the hundreds of thousands, Taiwan’s international residents are widely dispersed across the nation and play meaningful roles in many corners of society, from family caretakers to corporate CEOs, making them essential to Taiwan’s existence as a dynamic, growing, global nation.
Despite its enormous diversity, the nation’s foreign community generally maintains a low profile, and is thus normally left out of public discussions and the calculations of Taiwanese government decisionmakers.
This is particularly the case during times of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. While the majority of foreign residents overflow with praise for their lives here (borne out by Taiwan’s No. 1 rankings in InterNation’s annual Expat Insider global expatriate satisfaction surveys in 2016, 2019 and this year), that positive perspective has been significantly dented by blanket pandemic policies that have effectively and indefinitely prevented thousands of foreigners from arriving to begin working or studying here, or from simply rejoining family members in Taiwan.
Although Taiwanese authorities recently announced that they were working to allow about 13,000 international university students to enter for studies here, no indication has been given about entry for hundreds of foreign employees (and families) who have already been granted visas and permission to work and live in Taiwan, but are unable to enter because they do not possess Alien Residence Certificates (ARCs), which are only issued after they arrive here. This situation is having a severe impact on them and their employers, ranging from some of Taiwan’s largest foreign investors in the wind power, chipmaking, aerospace and other industries to international schools, whose operations are being disrupted as new teachers remain stuck outside the country.
In addition, hundreds of non-ARC-holding foreigners have not been able to enter and reunite with their spouses and/or children in Taiwan, as virtually all foreign visa applications have reportedly been suspended by Taiwan’s consular offices abroad. Accentuating this frustrating situation, the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) and other government bodies have not effectively communicated any concrete standards regarding how and when entry restrictions would be lifted or given any indication that it is taking the above needs into consideration, leaving individuals, companies and families in a complete state of limbo.
Other blanket COVID-19 restrictions are also leading to growing unhappiness in the international community and a fraying of the many strands that help make Taiwan such an appealing place. These range from the excessive masking requirements for those exercising outdoors to the much-criticized demand that family members must quarantine separately, forcing parents to divide up young children between them for two weeks and causing a tremendous amount of unnecessary stress.
Overall, one of the biggest recent sources of frustration among international residents is the sense that they have no voice or channel for making their perspectives and concerns heard. There has been little to no public discussion of these issues by the government or larger organizations that claim to represent the interests of the international community. This helped lead an American friend who has launched not one, but two, high-tech business ventures in Taiwan over the past several years to pack up and leave in July and he is probably not alone.
Most foreigners love Taiwan and its people, are strong advocates for this nation, and share a strong appreciation for Taiwan’s successes in battling COVID-19 and the significant challenges that it is currently facing in regard to the Delta variant of SARS-CoV-2 and vaccinations. They are not requesting measures that would put Taiwan at an unreasonable risk. Rather, they are asking that their voices be heard and considered in the ongoing discussion about pandemic policies, that government policies and standards be clearly defined and communicated to the international community, and that the CECC and other government bodies and leaders devise and revise COVID-19 measures on the basis of science and other reasonable considerations, and not on unreasonable fear — both of the virus and of bearing responsibility.
Given Taiwan’s very strict requirements for new arrivals and successes at managing the COVID-19 crisis, I am confident that a balance can be maintained between opening the doors to the above-mentioned foreigners and keeping all residents safe, thereby boosting Taiwan’s well-earned global reputation as one of the world’s best places to live and work.
Douglas Habecker is the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taichung and copublisher of Compass Magazine, a Taichung city guide.
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