On Aug. 12, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) published its biennial Improving International Fisheries Management Report, which once again included Taiwan as engaging in illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU) fishing.
Although the EU in 2019 lifted its IUU “yellow card” warning against Taiwan, following Taipei’s efforts to address the issue, the NOAA has again reported that Taiwan engages in such activities. This raises doubts over whether Taiwan’s management of distant water fishing vessels has improved.
In the past few years, the nation has been strongly criticized internationally for using forced labor on fishing vessels, but it has worked hard to curb IUU fishing, such as by amending the Act for Distant Water Fisheries (遠洋漁業條例), incorporating international regulations, demanding that fishing vessels install vessel monitoring systems and even greatly increasing the penalty for IUU fishing.
To enhance its law enforcement capacity, the Fisheries Agency has also established a 24-hour fishery monitoring center, designated foreign ports for vessels to unload catches and sent inspectors to check the catches.
However, the NOAA report said that in the past few years, Taiwan-flagged vessels have contravened regional fishery management organizations’ regulations for catch transshipment and shark-related conservation measures.
For example, they have contravened the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas’ ban on transshipment between vessels, and the fin-to-carcass ratio during transshipment of sharks.
Taking a closer look at the report, it is not difficult to see that the act of transshipment that is crucial to distant water fisheries might pose a challenge to Taiwan’s fishery management.
To bring their catches to market faster, fishing vessels either enter ports or engage in transshipment at sea by transferring catches to large carrier ships. As carrier ships deliver the catches to the destinations, fishing vessels can stay at sea and continue operations.
Although such transshipment seems harmless and efficient, it could become a breeding ground for illegal conduct in the absence of complete regulations and effective monitoring.
Taiwan’s regulations for transshipment are relatively strict. For example, to compare transshipment information in real time to detect illegal activity, regional fishery management organizations require the information to be submitted to agencies within a certain period of time. Taiwan requires that fishing vessels submit the information within seven days, which is sooner than many regional fishery management organizations.
Taiwan also requires that fishing vessels only go out to sea when they are equipped with a vessel monitoring system, and must report their position once every hour, which is not required by all flag states.
Still, to effectively manage transshipment at sea, apart from strengthening management measures, Taiwan should also promote a more complete set of checks at regional fishery management organizations. The management of transshipment normally involves fishing vessels and government agencies of more than one country, so a set of shared management measures would help cover loopholes during transshipment.
If Taiwan wants to root out IUU fishing, it must intensify monitoring. Since it has been developing an electronic monitoring system for many years, it should seize this opportunity by taking the initiative to share its experience with the world to promote the development of an e-observer system domestically and internationally, and use this development to increase the system’s coverage and improve the management of distant water fishing vessels.
Lisa Tsai is a freelancer.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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