Taiwan signed agreements on judicial cooperation with Slovakia and Poland on Tuesday and Wednesday respectively, and on Wednesday completed the extradition of a Polish prisoner.
The extradition case is just the latest involving nationals from Germany, the UK and Denmark, the Ministry of Justice said on Wednesday, as it lauded the increase in cooperation with European nations.
Such agreements are of great importance, as Taiwanese arrested in countries without such agreements are often extradited to China, where they do not receive a fair trial. Also, these agreements can help deal with alleged criminals from countries with which Taiwan does not share extradition treaties, who often hide in Taiwan.
For example, a US citizen known as Christian Taylor, who was wanted in the US for commercial burglary, hid in Taiwan for 13 years before he was caught and extradited in May last year. Another American, Cody Wilson, was extradited in September 2018 to face sexual assault charges in the US. In both cases, Taiwanese and US officials worked out special arrangements for the deportations based on a mutual assistance agreement, as the two countries do not have an extradition treaty.
Such one-time special arrangements have been worked out with other countries, but they are generally time-consuming due to the lack of formal agreements, and Taiwanese arrested abroad are often extradited to China before Taiwanese officials can finalize a deal.
With the introduction of Hong Kong’s National Security Law, Taiwanese should worry about extradition to China when they visit countries that have treaties with Hong Kong, even if one does not exist with China, Taiwan Thinktank consultant Tung Li-wen (董立文) said in July last year.
However, the decision of the Czech Constitutional Court in April last year not to extradite eight Taiwanese to China, on the basis that they might face torture there, shows that even countries that adhere to a “one China” policy might ignore their agreements with China if there is a justifiable reason.
Seeking formal judicial agreements with other countries with which Taiwan does not have formal relations would make it easier for such extradition decisions to be made. Such agreements would also not contravene the “one China” policy, if countries wish to continue adhering to that idea, as many countries have special judicial agreements with Hong Kong — made before the National Security Law was implemented. Since there was once a legal basis for countries to extradite Hong Kongers — who are Chinese citizens — to Hong Kong, but not to mainland China, surely Taiwanese who are accused of crimes could be extradited to Taiwan without making any statement about Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Such judicial agreements would also strongly deter fugitives who would consider fleeing to Taiwan and put Taiwanese society at risk.
Taiwan has bilateral legal assistance treaties with allies and non-allies including Belize, Nauru, the Philippines, South Africa, the US and others. These treaties benefit all involved by helping to combat international crime, and they are especially valuable for Taiwan, which has had its applications to join Interpol rejected due to pressure from China. Not allowing Taiwan to participate in Interpol is dangerous for international society, as it creates a loophole that criminals and fugitives can exploit. As Taiwan increasingly enters into agreements with friendly nations, it will have a growing network of partners in the fight against international crime to help mitigate its lack of Interpol membership.
Taiwan must continue to seek cooperative agreements with friendly nations in areas such as law, education and trade to strengthen itself and its partners while resisting Chinese hegemony.
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