Japan’s growing geopolitical importance will be showcased in the coming days as the country hosts the US secretaries of state and defense on Monday next week, and helps convene a reported Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) meeting of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and US President Joe Biden.
Next week’s visit by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Tokyo will be the first major overseas trip of the key officials. Their destination — where they are to meet for so-called “two plus two” talks with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Toshimitsu Motegi and Japanese Minister of Defense Nobuo Kishi — reflects growing US concerns about the challenge posed by a rising China, and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region is highest on the agenda, and the US is seeking to strengthen ties with its four key regional allies. Japan is at the heart of this, with the nation increasingly perceived by the US as a critical bulwark against the advance of China, and potentially Russia, in the region, as was the case during the Cold War.
US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has called the four-way Quad forum the “foundation upon which to build substantial US policy” in the region, and Blinken is on Thursday next week scheduled to engage online with his counterparts in India, Australia and Tokyo.
One of the items under discussion is a new campaign that Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and New Delhi are working on to distribute COVID-19 vaccines in the Asia-Pacific region to counter the influence of China. The White House has held talks with other members of the Quad about this new diplomatic and security initiative.
Important as Australia and India are in the Quad, the Biden team sees Japan as a potential anchor of the US-led anti-China alliance. Tokyo is a long-standing member of Western clubs, such as the G7, and Washington values not just the geopolitical, but also the financial lynchpin role that Tokyo can play as the world’s third-largest economy.
Beyond the structural factors driving Japan’s foreign policy, former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe — the longest-serving prime minister in the nation’s history — proved adept at consolidating relationships with Western leaders. He even succeeded in persuading former US president Donald Trump with his “America first” outlook that the security of Japan needed a strong US commitment as the “cornerstone of peace” in the Asia-Pacific region.
This has created a significant legacy for Suga to build upon and fortify Japan-US ties in the face of significant international uncertainty about a range of issues, including North Korea. Concerns about Pyongyang are rising again after an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report indicated possible reprocessing of nuclear fuel for bombs.
US officials believe that the move could be intended as a bargaining chip with the Biden team to press for sanctions relief. As Washington reviews its North Korea policy, the IAEA called Pyongyang’s continued nuclear activity a breach of UN sanctions and “deeply regrettable.”
Under Trump, Japan had been worried that the then-US president might seek to strike a deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un under which Pyongyang would agree to give up missiles capable of reaching the US, without eliminating short and medium-range missiles that threaten Tokyo and other Japanese cities.
However, the issue has become less salient given the stalling of Trump’s dialogue with North Korea, and Blinken has said Biden’s approach to North Korea could involve more sanctions or other unspecified diplomatic incentives.
Yet, the major driver for the increasing closeness of US-Japan ties is China, with a range of worries including Beijing’s assertiveness around Japan-controlled islands in the East China Sea. This is why Tokyo would welcome its centrality in US foreign policy in the Biden era.
Both sides would reiterate in forthcoming meetings their opposition to unilateral attempts to change the “status quo” by force or coercion in the East and South China seas, and share their “deep concerns” over Beijing’s controversial coast guard law.
The legislation, implemented on Feb. 1, allows the China Coast Guard to use weapons against foreign ships it sees as illegally entering Chinese waters, raising concerns that it could result in an escalation of maritime disputes.
China Coast Guard vessels have repeatedly engaged in Japanese waters around the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, called the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) in China, in an apparent attempt to undermine Japan’s control over them.
Taken together, this is why Tokyo’s importance in the Western alliance is of growing, strategic importance. Building from its long-standing membership of clubs like the G7, the Biden team believes that Japan could now become the anchor of the Quad as it seeks to double down on US alliances in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Trump era.
Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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