In his inaugural address, US President Joe Biden declared that Americans “will be judged” for how they “resolve the cascading crises of our era.” He expressed confidence that the country would “rise to the occasion” and pledged that the US would lead “not merely by the example of our power, but by the power of our example.”
The contrast with former US president Donald Trump’s divisive, isolationist rhetoric could not be sharper.
However, adopting a different tone is easier than reversing the US’ relative decline. To do that, Biden would need to provide wise, forward-looking leadership. And that does not necessarily mean breaking with everything that Trump did.
The US’ debilitating political polarization has undermined its international standing. Biden’s calls for unity reflect his awareness of this.
However, the truth is that healing the deep rupture in US society might be beyond any US president’s ability. So, rather than becoming consumed by domestic political divisions, Biden must rise above them.
There is broad bipartisan consensus in one area: the need to stand up to China.
Trump understood this. His tough China policy is his most consequential — and constructive — foreign-policy legacy. Unless Biden pursues a similar approach, the erosion of US global leadership would become inexorable.
The Indo-Pacific region — a global economic hub and geopolitical hotspot — is central to an effective China strategy. Recognizing the region’s immense importance to world order, China has been steadily reshaping it to serve its own interests.
The only way to preserve a stable regional balance of power is with a rules-based, democracy-led order — or, as the Trump administration put it: a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Over the past year, this vision has spurred the region’s democracies to deepen their strategic bonds, and inspired even the faraway democracies of Europe to implement supportive policies. Under the Biden administration’s leadership, countries must build on this progress, creating a true concert of democracies capable of providing stability and balance in the Indo-Pacific.
Biden seems to understand this. He has made clear his intention to build a united democratic front to counter China.
However, he is also at risk of undermining his own vision.
For starters, Biden did not embrace the term “Indo-Pacific” until after his electoral victory, and when he did, he replaced “free and open” with “secure and prosperous.”
Whereas “free and open” implies a rules-based, democracy-led order, “secure and prosperous” leaves room for the inclusion of — and even leadership by — autocratic regimes.
This ignores the crux of the Indo-Pacific challenge: A revisionist China is seeking to supplant the US as the region’s dominant power.
Making matters worse, Biden has signaled a possible reset of ties with China, which would play right into its hands.
Trump’s China policy was not just about trade or human rights. It sent the right message that China is a predatory communist state without political legitimacy or rule of law.
This helped to tip the scales in the US’ favor. Over the past year, unfavorable perceptions of China reached historic highs in many countries. While this was largely because of the made-in-China COVID-19 pandemic, Trump’s ideological onslaught and China’s own aggression — such as on its Himalayan border with India — also played a role.
If the Biden administration abandons economic decoupling and treats China as a major competitor, rather than an implacable adversary, it would tip the scales in the opposite direction, relieving pressure on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) regime and undermining faith in US leadership. This could embolden China to further destabilize the Indo-Pacific region, with Taiwan possibly its next direct target.
Moreover, US conciliation would give India second thoughts about aligning itself too closely with Washington and would likely lead to Japan’s militarization. It would also facilitate China’s efforts to leverage its vast market to draw in the US’ democratic allies — a risk underscored by its investment deal with the EU signed late last year.
All of this would undermine efforts to forge the united democratic front that Biden envisions, compounding the threat of China’s aggressive authoritarianism.
The worst choice Biden could make would be to seek shared leadership with China in the Indo-Pacific region, as some are advocating.
Worryingly, Biden’s team does not seem clear on this. In a 2019 essay, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and US Security Council Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell championed “coexistence with China,” describing the country as “an essential US partner.”
To be sure, Sullivan and Campbell did not call for US-China joint hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region or beyond, but they also did not take the clear and necessary position that the US must forge a concert of democracies to bring sustained multilateral pressure to bear on China.
Biden is right to tout the importance of domestic unity and a tough line on China is one of the few policy areas behind which Americans can unite.
More importantly, it is the only way to ensure a stable Indo-Pacific regional and world order.
Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
From the Iran war and nuclear weapons to tariffs and artificial intelligence, the agenda for this week’s Beijing summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is packed. Xi would almost certainly bring up Taiwan, if only to demonstrate his inflexibility on the matter. However, no one needs to meet with Xi face-to-face to understand his stance. A visit to the National Museum of China in Beijing — in particular, the “Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition, which chronicles the rise and rule of the Chinese Communist Party — might be even more revealing. Xi took the members
Taiwan’s higher education system is facing an existential crisis. As the demographic drop-off continues to empty classrooms, universities across the island are locked in a desperate battle for survival, international student recruitment and crucial Ministry of Education funding. To win this battle, institutions have turned to what seems like an objective measure of quality: global university rankings. Unfortunately, this chase is a costly illusion, and taxpayers are footing the bill. In the past few years, the goalposts have shifted from pure research output to “sustainability” and “societal impact,” largely driven by commercial metrics such as the UK-based Times Higher Education (THE) Impact
The inter-Korean relationship, long defined by national division, offers the clearest mirror within East Asia for cross-strait relations. Yet even there, reunification language is breaking down. The South Korean government disclosed on Wednesday last week that North Korea’s constitutional revision in March had deleted references to reunification and added a territorial clause defining its border with South Korea. South Korea is also seriously debating whether national reunification with North Korea is still necessary. On April 27, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung marked the eighth anniversary of the Panmunjom Declaration, the 2018 inter-Korean agreement in which the two Koreas pledged to
I wrote this before US President Donald Trump embarked on his uneventful state visit to China on Thursday. So, I shall confine my observations to the joint US-Philippine military exercise of April 20 through May 8, known collectively as “Balikatan 2026.” This year’s Balikatan was notable for its “firsts.” First, it was conducted primarily with Taiwan in mind, not the Philippines or even the South China Sea. It also showed that in the Pacific, America’s alliance network is still robust. Allies are enthusiastic about America’s renewed leadership in the region. Nine decades ago, in 1936, America had neither military strength
RSS