From publicly available information on the Internet, one can easily ascertain the locations and formation of the US surface fleets in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Both fleets are centered around aircraft carrier groups headed by Nimitz-class nuclear-powered “supercarriers.”
The USS Nimitz, the lead ship of its class, which has been in service since 1975, and all other older aircraft carriers of the US Navy have undergone extensive capability upgrades and refits so that they are more than capable of dealing with current maritime threats. The newest carrier in the Nimitz class, the USS George H.W. Bush, has been in service for only 11 years.
This is different from former National Security Council secretary-general Su Chi’s (蘇起) assertion during a discussion forum last month, when he said that the US would not come to rescue Taiwan “because its aircraft carriers are aging, costly and in a poor state of repair.”
The Gerald R. Ford-class of aircraft carriers, currently under construction, are to become the US Navy’s next generation of carriers, replacing the Nimitz-class vessels. The first of its class, the USS Gerald R. Ford, was commissioned in 2017.
The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, under development for these next-generation carriers, is to allow aircraft handlers to launch and recover aircraft much faster than a conventional steam catapult. China’s navy is reportedly struggling to achieve a breakthrough in the development of an equivalent system for its own carriers.
Are the US aircraft carriers currently in service really that old?
Whether examined from the perspective of US naval strategy and data, or from the US Navy’s operational experience, the US carriers remain unsurpassed.
Not only are they still technically superior to any other nation’s carriers, the US carriers also make an immeasurable contribution to safeguarding freedom of navigation in oceans worldwide.
Contrast this with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy: Although having in the past few years rapidly grown in size, there remains a large question mark over the actual combat ability of its untested ships.
Also, the PLA Army has gained no significant combat experience since its disastrous invasion of Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. China’s navy is even more of an unknown quantity, as it has never been tested in an external conflict.
In air, sea or on land, the US armed forces still surpass every other nation. The US military’s strength lies in the quality of its training, backed up by the latest technology, strict discipline and the democratic society on which it is based.
Ever since its aircraft carriers wiped the floor in the Pacific theater of World War II, the US has dominated the world’s waterways. Today, it is leading the way, constructing a new class of aircraft “supercarriers.”
Let there be no more baseless talk of the US carrier force being outdated and unable to counter an aggression by the PLA Navy.
Ray Song is a graduate of National Chung Cheng University’s Institute of Strategic and International Affairs.
Translated by Edward Jones
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS