As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolds across the globe, it has widened conflicts between China and the world. This has worsened as China implements aggressive propaganda efforts to blame the US for the novel coronavirus outbreak.
Xinhua news agency has released an animated video mocking the US response to the public health crisis.
This “blame game” diplomacy might make China appear strong to its domestic constituents, but it severely jeopardizes the nation’s credibility in the eyes of the international community.
Beijing’s latest decision to act tough against the West signifies the escalating dictatorial trend under the reign of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
Following his ascension to power in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has greatly consolidated its autocratic governance from within.
Xi has called for the subordination of the government to the party: There is no separation between party and government, only divisions of labor or duties.
This new orientation differs from the political culture of the 1980s, when former supreme leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) and many reformist officials strove to pull CCP cadres out of the everyday management of the gigantic government bureaucracy to concentrate solely on the wider sphere of ideology and politics.
Merging the party organs and government into a united entity has become a new mandate in Xi’s China. The ultimate goal is to strengthen, not weaken, the communist domination in the political, social, economic, cultural, religious and digital domains.
The incremental transition toward a top-down system of socialist autocracy has intensified in recent years, blurring the boundary between party and government.
Disguised as part of a nationwide campaign to tame systematic corruption, resolve widespread indiscipline and restore faith in governing institutions, Xi has urged officials and citizens to swear allegiance to his absolute leadership.
One notorious example is the expansion of the CCP’s control over personnel management in public institutions, state-owned enterprises and private businesses. The mighty party-state has taken over the task of allocating personnel and institutional resources within these organizations.
It is firmly in charge of all areas of human resource management for government departments and non-party organizations, including covering civil servants who are not party members and leaders of all the religious patriotic bodies.
The China Publishing Group, the largest state-owned publisher, has come under the direct supervision of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department.
This same arrangement goes for film studios and television networks.
Evidently, the state has a final say on the production, transmission and circulation of media content.
The state skillfully utilizes social media technologies to restrict people’s access to outside information, and deprives them of the opportunity to have a meaningful dialogue on pressing public issues.
During the peak of the COVID-19 outbreak in China, the state turned to tech giants Alibaba and Tencent to develop color-coded systems to classify people based on their health and travel history, and assigned a digital health code to residents in Wuhan and nearby townships.
People who were infected were given a red health marker and had to stay at home for weeks. Once they recovered and showed no symptoms, they could receive a green marker to be allowed to go outside.
This cyber dictatorship dismisses any concern for the protection of citizens’ data and privacy.
On the surface, Xi appears to have resurrected the old Leninist party-state system in which the CCP’s leadership commands the highest political and ideological authority over the masses, and the supreme leader’s legitimacy originates from, and is authorized by, the party itself.
In reality, there has been a subtle change in this power relationship, because Xi has created a delicate system of interpersonal supervision to tighten his control over high-ranking party, government and military officials.
The ultimate validation of the political and ideological rule is Xi himself, who is not constrained at all.
Today’s cadres and bureaucrats only acquire their legitimate authority by adhering to Xi’s dictatorial rule.
From the perspective of domestic politics, China’s diplomatic maneuvers and tracks amid the pandemic, while appearing unapologetic, are a mere reflection of Xi’s policy agenda and preferences.
Unfortunately, this combative diplomacy has set off too many firestorms and galvanized opinions critical of Xi at home and abroad.
It is bound to dissipate China’s hard-earned standing and reputation in the global community.
Joseph Tse-hei Lee is history professor at Pace University in New York City.
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