In the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, the international community, which largely follows a “one China” policy, was mostly oblivious to the fact that Taiwan’s health and medical network is in no sense subordinate to that of China or even connected to it. By pretending that Taiwan is part of China, many countries effectively allowed Taiwan to become orphaned from international health and medical networks.
In the process of controlling the coronavirus, Taiwan was for a time dragged down by China. It was treated as part of the outbreak zone and made subject to travel bans or restrictions by countries such as Italy.
Later on, China wanted to declare victory in the fight against the pandemic, but Taiwan was still discovering imported cases of COVID-19 among citizens returning from abroad. To claim that it had achieved zero new cases, China took the “bold step” of excluding Taiwan from its COVID-19 statistics.
It can be seen from this that even though China uses the rhetoric of “one China” to promote its unification strategy, it sees “one China” as dispensable under certain circumstances.
As for Taiwan, China sees it as a toxic issue that causes nothing but trouble.
Taiwan should exert the same boldness in its interactions with the international community as China did when excluding Taiwan. When deciding what to call itself, it should avoid using language that could cause confusion about Taiwan’s separate identity.
“Taiwan and China — one country on each side” is not so much an independence slogan as an accurate description of reality. For Taiwanese to call themselves “Taiwan” in their dealings with the international community does not symbolize Taiwanese independence — it merely reiterates the reality that Taiwan is not governed by China.
Changing the nation’s title in the Chinese language would involve amending the Constitution, but that does not mean that Taiwan can only use one name in English. In its foreign relations, the nation can follow the principle of highlighting “Taiwan” when naming itself in foreign-language documents, while doing its best to avoid formulas that are too similar to those of China.
This would help to ensure that the international community clearly recognizes the political reality that Taiwan and China do not own or rule one another.
For example, Taiwan does not use the title “Republic of China” when it takes part in international sports events or WTO meetings. These are all technical details of the way that administrative documents are translated into foreign languages. They also constitute a pragmatic approach to events concerning foreign relations that does not involve amending the Constitution or altering the cross-strait “status quo.”
Taiwan cooperates with the international community. Its performance as an outstanding member of the international community has been clear for all to see during the course of the pandemic and China cannot be allowed to steal Taiwan’s limelight.
As for China, its neglect of its duties as a member of the international community has attracted widespread condemnation, as has its dreadful record on human rights.
Hopefully the Taiwanese government will seize this rare opportunity and make good use of all available possibilities to make the international community clear about Taiwan’s sovereignty and independent status, while drawing a clear line between Taiwan and China.
Liu Chi-wei is a lawyer and director of the Northern Taiwan Society.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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