It is human nature to discuss issues, share gossip and criticize each other’s ideas. This is especially true for academics, who love making and defending arguments. However, in a pandemic, they must be careful to use their knowledge and voices responsibly.
Some intellectuals use clever arguments, colorful charts and attractive figures to suggest that Taiwan’s COVID-19 situation is in danger of becoming like Japan’s out-of-control emergency scenario.
Although their intentions are unclear, some appear to be taking advantage of the circumstances to gain fame and build a fan base.
Their words can result in a dangerous level of panic, so it is important to understand how the situations in Taiwan and Japan differ.
During the past two months, the Taiwanese government and public have worked together to defend against new incursions of the coronavirus. Other countries are looking at Taiwan as an example of a successful defense strategy.
A small number of local infections were diagnosed and treated immediately, with the rest involving individuals arriving from overseas. As of Tuesday last week, there were only three cases out of a total of 393 for which no infection source could be identified.
For all others, the sources and transmission paths were clear.
The situation in Japan is different. Multiple community infections with unknown sources for individual cases emerged early last month. Infection numbers exploded one week after its three-day vernal equinox holiday (March 20 to 22), with each day bringing a record number of cases.
By April 11, the number of infections in Japan had exceeded 6,000, a sixfold increase from before the holiday.
There are two explanations for Japan’s situation. First, there were numerous coronavirus carriers already in the country before the holiday, with many contagious individuals not yet exhibiting symptoms.
They did not know their infection status, and therefore they freely went about their daily activities.
Second, Japanese cherry trees blossomed early this year — in many places they peaked during the three-day holiday. Large numbers of Japanese took advantage of the holiday to enjoy the cherry blossoms, and the crowds created perfect environments for virus transmission.
Many Japanese have expressed deep regret about what happened, but at the time, they were unaware of the number of coronavirus carriers in their midst.
Meanwhile, one week after Taiwan’s four-day spring holiday, the nation was not experiencing an explosive outbreak or setting new infection records every day. The efforts of the Taiwanese government (especially its public health agency workers) and citizens, as well as the nation’s experience with the SARS outbreak in 2003, are to thank for this.
Although there are no local COVID-19 cases in Taiwan — that is, no cases that have not been tracked to their (mostly overseas) sources — many people are living with tension, suspicion and fear. It is the responsibility of academics to help people understand the actual situation, and to guide them in continuing the fight to keep the coronavirus under control.
Instead of using false comparisons, clever wordplay or fancy charts that can cause confusion, intellectuals should do their part in guiding Taiwanese through this crisis.
Huang Chung-yuan is a professor at Chang Gung University’s Graduate Institute of Computer Science and Information Engineering.
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