Fri, Oct 20, 2017 page8

• Chinese, N Korean distrust grows

  • By Joseph Tse-Hei Lee 李榭熙
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  There has been much pessimism about North Korea giving up its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The escalating nuclear crisis has become a serious test of the US’ and China’s capacity to solve the regional security problems of the 21st century.

  Three schools of thought can be discerned among strategists concerned about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions in Washington, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo.

  The first school emphasizes the need to engage North Korea thoroughly to minimize tensions and convince Pyongyang that military invasion and regime change would not be on the table.

  This logic is based on the liberal principle that active engagement and economic aid through a multilateral framework, such as in the Six-Party Talks, would be a feasible trust-building tactic, eliminating mutual hostility and transforming the North into a cooperative actor.

  The second conventional view is derived from political realism, according to which Washington ought to intensify pressure on Pyongyang on all fronts, thereby provoking domestic resistance against North Korean leader Kim Jung-un’s regime and achieving some institutional change from within.

  This approach largely relies on the efficacy of a US-led coalition that is capable of urging China to squeeze the North more to back down on threats.

  The third approach appears to be the most dangerous. In recent months, Washington and Pyongyang have traded warnings and threats. On numerous occasions, US President Donald Trump has talked about a pre-emptive strike against North Korea.

  Trump ridiculed Kim as a “rocket man” in his address at the UN last month and announced his intention to “totally destroy” the regime.

  In response, the North ignored any call for calm and blamed the US for putting the Korean Peninsula on the brink of war.

  Of all the international powers, China wields much influence over North Korea and is in a position to shut down the North’s economy.

  Being geostrategic allies for decades, China has used North Korea to counterbalance the US as much as the North has depended on Chinese energy and aid for survival.

  In the past, China worried about an unprecedented refugee crisis on its northeast frontier in the event of a collapse of the Kim family dynasty. As with other emerging powers, China never wants to resolve one crisis only to have to face another, worse crisis.

  Although it sympathizes with the North’s rationale for pursuing nuclear weapons as a deterrence against the US military threat, China still hopes to retain some control over the agenda and process of nuclear dialogue between the US and North Korea.

  However, in light of the repercussions of Kim’s military adventurousness, much has changed in China’s policy toward the North.

  First, China has run out of patience with Pyongyang. A closer look at the timing of Kim’s nuclear maneuvers suggests that he never informed Beijing of his missile and nuclear tests.

  Kim deliberately stole the media spotlight from Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and forced China and the US to put North Korea back on their bilateral agendas.

  As Xi on Wednesday set out to assert absolute control at Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress, it remained unclear whether Kim would launch a nuclear test to divert worldwide attention from his glory.

  Second, China can no longer exploit the North Korean nuclear crisis to display competent leadership in regional politics and to maintain the minimal stability it desires.

  The six-party talks launched by former US presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama to denuclearize North Korea failed to achieve the desired objective, even though China participated in this multilateral platform and ensured that the US would not launch military actions against the North.

  Worse still, a nuclear North Korea has destabilized Northeast Asia and endangered relations with neighboring countries.

  China cannot draw on its experience of developing atomic bombs in the Maoist period to evaluate the danger of North Korea’s nuclear weapon programs.

  A nuclear arms race among North Korea, South Korea and Japan is definitely the last thing that China wants. It has become increasingly clear to China that dealing with a power vacuum in the event of a regime change might not be as bad as preserving North Korea at all cost.

  Whatever Kim is doing to antagonize Trump is not within Xi’s level of tolerance.

  Like it or not, the denuclearization of North Korea has become an integral part of US-China diplomatic encounters.

  The Trump administration has publicly complained that appealing to China for help has achieved little because Washington and Beijing share irreconcilable geopolitical agendas.

  As Beijing’s insistence on diplomatic engagement contradicts Washington’s preference for coercive measures, the two powers will not reach a consensus over North Korea’s future.

  Emphasizing denuclearization as a prerequisite to holding bilateral talks with the North, the US has yet to demonstrate its capability to mobilize allies and enforce stricter sanctions.

  However, the gradual evolution of the US-Japan-South Korea triangular defense alliance, the potential risks of a nuclear conflict in Northeast Asia and the consequences of a collapse of the North Korean state are bound to dictate the pragmatic calculations of decisionmakers in Washington and Beijing.

  As Trump and Kim engage in a rhetorical war, one can only hope that they know where the red line is and will not escalate the crisis into a full-scale Korean War II.

  Joseph Tse-Hei Lee is a professor of history at Pace University in New York City.
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