The eminent British historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975) last century observed that the 19th century had been “Britain’s century” and labeled the 20th century as the “American century.” Toynbee also made the prediction that the 21st century would be “China’s century.”
For Toynbee, the 19th century was close enough to still be within reach, while the 20th century was the century through which he lived most of his life. In saying that the 19th century was “Britain’s century,” he was interpreting the clear historical picture of that era. In stating that the 20th century was the “American century,” he was simply describing the events and reality that he observed unfolding before his eyes.
However, as Toynbee passed away in 1975, he had yet to witness the dawn of a new era, ushered in by the 21st century.
His assertion that the 21st century would be “China’s century” was based purely on conjecture. Whether Toynbee was correct in his prediction about China is one of the great questions of our time.
In fact, as we are now one-sixth of the way through this century, the answer to this question is gradually becoming apparent.
In terms of military matters, the People’s Republic of China’s actions in the South China Sea, around the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), around Taiwan and in the Taiwan Strait, and its border skirmishes with India all bear a striking resemblance to the actions of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the 1930s, both of which started out by bullying and invading their immediate neighbors.
Nazi Germany’s and Japan’s governments used military force to acquire territory and increase their power. Although the two regimes initially appeared to be in their element, it did not end well for either nation.
With the benefit of hindsight we can see that the 20th century did not belong to either Germany or Japan.
As the world becomes increasingly civilized, the question is whether China will succeed in its aim of augmenting its power and appropriating territory through brute force. Will its actions warrant labeling this century as China’s century?
One of the lessons that history teaches us is that it is constantly repeating itself. Perhaps an overly-ambitious China will repeat the “aggressive rise” of Germany and Japan in the1930s, only to end up utterly defeated.
In terms of the economy, Chinese have excelled themselves. They have for years been steadily snapping up large amounts of real estate, minerals, companies and even playing the game of corporate takeovers in the US, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia.
The rapid pace of China’s expansion has been nothing short of breathtaking. According to a report by the BBC, in 2015 alone, China spent roughly US$110 billion purchasing properties and land in the US for commercial use: China is now the biggest foreign investor in US real estate.
The problem is that, while China’s wealthy elite have been busy acquiring fixed assets abroad, the situation in China is somewhat different — there are even signs that the reverse is true.
This should not be surprising: Relying on “black money” of dubious origin, a comparatively large proportion of Chinese officials have moved up into the ranks of the super-wealthy.
If you were a corrupt Chinese mandarin needing to launder some illicit funds, would you risk attracting the attention of others by buying up property and assets at home, or would you find a way to transfer your money abroad?
Wealthy Chinese who do not possess extensive connections to their government are particularly alert to the political crackdowns of recent years, perhaps in particular to the case of China’s 32nd-richest man, businessman Xiao Jianhua (蕭建華), who in January this year “was disappeared” from Hong Kong’s Four Seasons hotel where he was staying.
They will have asked themselves: “If it could happen in Hong Kong to one of the wealthiest men, could it not happen to me? Rather than wait, perhaps I should get ahead of the pack, dispose of my hot assets and relocate abroad?”
The preferred activity of China’s super-rich is finding new and inventive ways to shift as many of their assets abroad as quickly as possible — but are these conventional investment flows overseas or are China’s wealthy citizens, like passengers on the stricken Titanic, already scrambling for the lifeboats?
The answer appears obvious: Wealthy Chinese are voting with their feet. The “Chinese century” has not turned out quite how Toynbee predicted.
It will be the century when Chinese people say to their government: “No thanks, I’m leaving.”
Chang Kuo-tsai is a retired associate professor at National Hsinchu University of Education and a former deputy secretary-general of the Taiwan Association of University Professors.
Translated by Edward Jones
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