In recent years, Chinese entrepreneurs and youth have often claimed to have certain “wolf culture” qualities. They believe that Chinese youth are aggressive, do not back away from competition and will do anything it takes to achieve their goals. They feel that this force is set to sweep across the world.
Now, even before the Chinese have realized their dream of ruling the world, Chinese youth are already displaying their wolf culture.
THE HUNT
First, let us analyze what this wolf culture really is. Wolves are social animals. They appear to be aggressive and usually move and hunt in packs. This means that their ability to attack alone is low, and they generally rely on group force. From this perspective, the Chinese — brainwashed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — are indeed aggressive against any enemy appointed by their party-state.
Take for example the Chinese government’s trick of manipulating the anti-Japanese complex, which once drove large numbers of Chinese to the streets in China, attacking Japanese stores and burning Japanese cars.
When Beijing ordered that Taiwanese independence be stopped, countless Chinese netizens flooded Facebook pages or Web sites of specific Taiwanese politicians and media outlets, leaving hateful posts.
These attacks have one thing in common: They were launched collectively and individual actions were rare.
FALSE PRIDE
Today, Chinese are living amid an empty and false nationalist fanaticism. There is a lack of cultural foundation, rational thinking and discussion in this nationalistic fervor.
When they compare themselves with Taiwan, Chinese are trapped in a state of envy and disgust. They envy Taiwanese democracy and are unable to change the system in China and so force themselves into accepting the distorted values that the CCP has constructed.
Chinese believe that an authoritarian society is more efficient and that centralization of power is the best management style, and feel that as long as national development is the premise, individual rights can be sacrificed.
SUPERIORITY COMPLEX
In a situation where individual values are being restricted in this way, it is necessary to unite and work together. Chinese have been taught to replace all personal will with the need for national success.
When Chinese are faced with the ideas of a developed nation, their national superiority complex and personal inferiority complex come into play at the same time.
They could be quite fragile mentally, and every time someone in Taiwan claims that Taiwan is an independent state or political entity, and whenever Taiwan holds a major election, Chinese suffer a strong sense of relative deprivation.
A TRAGEDY
The tragedy of not being able to improve the current situation through democratic procedures has made them emotionally fragile, as if they had a “heart of glass” (玻璃心) that would shatter when faced with setbacks.
As the Chinese generally lack solid beliefs or values, they have no choice but to act in packs like wolves, taking every opportunity to oppress Taiwanese.
However, without being backed by rational thinking, such behavior could easily trigger a breakdown.
Lin Yu-lun is general management director of the Free Taiwan Party.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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