Japan reached a landmark deal with South Korea to resolve a long-standing dispute over South Korean women it forced into sexual service during World War II, also known as “comfort women.” However, its reluctance to initiate similar talks with Taiwan indicates that the two nations have a long way to go before reaching an agreement on the issue.
Given that the relationship between Japan and South Korea has traditionally been rocky, and that Taiwan has maintained a good rapport with Japan, it is difficult to understand the dual standards to which Japan has held its two neighbors: It issued an apology and promised monetary compensation to South Korea, while keeping Taiwan on the sidelines, despite the Taiwanese government’s repeated calls for an apology and compensation.
If Japan continues to stall talks over Taiwanese comfort women, this would surely have a negative impact on the friendship forged between the two nation over the years.
It was not the first time Japan has apologized for forcing women into sexual service — Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe publicly apologized on two occasions in 2007.
However, Abe’s previous apologies were addressed to all Asian nations whose women Japan coerced into sexual service, while the last apology was the first to be specifically directed at a nation — a move which commentators said was due in part to the US pressing Tokyo to mend ties with South Korea, thereby advancing its “pivot to Asia” by improving trilateral relations with two of its most important allies in the region.
This suggests that Japan is not entirely sincere about its apology.
A major controversy erupted in South Korea after it was learned that the government had engaged in a quid pro quo negotiation with Japan to remove a statue of a girl representing comfort women, erected in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, in exchange for US$8.3 million compensation for the surviving comfort women. Some lawmakers and civic groups accused South Korean President Park Geun-hye of having struck a deal that betrayed South Koreans.
Japan’s demand that issues surrounding comfort women be “finally and irreversibly resolved” speaks volumes about its hope to use the compensation as a fig leaf, so that South Korea would stop bringing up Japan’s wartime violations.
This shows that it is unlikely that other nations — such as Taiwan, the Philippines and the Netherlands — to which Japan still owes an apology for the offense, would receive the same treatment as South Korea, if Japan really views an apology and compensation as a political bargaining chip.
With only four surviving comfort women left in Taiwan, Japan should issue a swift response to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ demand that it initiate talks, as after a protracted period of frustrations when seeking justice, there would not be a better time for the women to restore their dignity.
The government might not care about the compensation as much as a formal apology from the Japanese prime minister, but the women who were forced into sexual service clearly do and no matter how insignificant the money would be for the Japanese government, their calls should not be allowed to fall on deaf ears.
Despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties, Japan and Taiwan have managed to engage diplomatic exchanges, and their people are known to treat each other with kindness.
However, Japan would be keeping Taiwan at arm’s length if it refuses to heal the nation’s historic wounds in a fair and honest manner.
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