Ever since direct elections were first held in Taiwan, there has always been a televised presidential debate. For the Jan. 16 election, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has agreed to participate in a debate on SET-TV, but the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) wants it to be broadcast by Public Television Service (PTS).
The DPP has since expressed reservations about the KMT’s alternative plan, sparking public concern that there might not be a televised debate before the election.
Given the huge impact that the first televised debate held during the Nixon-Kennedy US presidential election in 1960, televised debates have been viewed as an important way to influence the outcome of an election. If either candidate fails to adequately prepare, they will lose the opportunity to decisively change the course of events and win over the public. At the very least, presidential candidates aim to use the debate to lock in their core vote.
According to a recent poll conducted by the Taiwan Brain Trust, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) continues to lead, with a support rating of 48.2 percent, while the KMT’s Eric Chu (朱立倫) has 19.4 percent and the People First Party’s James Soong (宋楚瑜) has 11.6 percent. Short of a major incident, a DPP victory appears to be a shoo-in. Perhaps for this reason, Tsai is reluctant to debate, fearing it may hand her opponents the chance to bolster their campaigns or cause the DPP to shed votes.
Conversely, the Chu camp, lagging behind, wants to put its all into the fight, and sees the television debate as an opportunity to reverse its political fortunes. Chu’s team also hopes to be able to expose and attack what it sees as a weak spot in Tsai’s politics: cross-strait policy. It hopes this will help to remove the bad smell that has hung around the KMT ever since it ditched its original presidential candidate, the dispute around the party’s legislator-at-large list and, more recently, allegations of dodgy property transactions surrounding Chu’s running mate, Jennifer Wang (王如玄).
Needless to say, the question over which television network hosts the debate is simply a technical matter and should not prevent it from going ahead. The teams of each presidential candidate should work to remove any obstacles that remain in place, to prevent disappointing the public.
Despite its importance, a televised debate is simply one means among many that the presidential candidates have at their disposal to communicate their views and policies to the electorate. Aside from the televised information programs and election bulletins provided by the Central Election Commission, what else can candidates do to inform the public of their views?
From relatively early on, Tsai has used a succession of press conferences to convey her political views to the public. Tsai has also released a book which sets out her political beliefs. In contrast, the KMT switched candidates mid-race, which has left its campaign team little time to get the party’s message out. To date, the Chu camp has only been able to put out a handful of advertisements: The flow of information is clearly insufficient.
Given the advances in communication technology, candidates should be able to make full use of social media Web sites to increase interaction and contact with the electorate. They can also use different forms of social media to engage in effective two-way dialogue on issues and problems that concern voters. Whether through text messages or video, voters would be able to directly pose questions to the candidates, and the candidates would be able to appeal directly to voters. This would be a far more effective and penetrative method of political broadcasting than a traditional televised debate.
Instead of the candidates squabbling among themselves over who should televise the debates, would it not be better if they each went online and faced the electorate head-on?
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