The two cases of Chinese espionage uncovered in the US and Taiwan within the past month indicate that China’s intelligence operations are typical of other intelligence agencies worldwide, which are not as unique as many Westerners tend to think.
In the first case, US citizen Glenn Duffie Shriver pled guilty on Oct. 22 to applying to the CIA at the behest of a Chinese intelligence agency — US authorities have not yet indicated which agency. Chinese intelligence officers identified Shriver in 2004 after he responded to an advertisement in Shanghai calling for papers on US-China relations.
Between Shriver’s recruitment and his arrest in June, Chinese intelligence officers apparently paid him US$70,000 to apply for a position in the US Foreign Service and, later, the CIA.
Chinese intelligence officers identified Shriver and saw future potential in a Chinese-speaking American with an interest in international relations.
At first, one Chinese officer, “Amanda,” met him and later introduced him to two other intelligence officers. Over the course of several meetings, Shriver agreed to work for the Chinese intelligence agency and discussed career options that would give him access to US foreign policy and national security information.
In the second case, the arrests of Taiwanese businessman Lo Pin (羅斌) and Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) Colonel Lo Chi-cheng (羅奇正) are typical of the way China conducts espionage against Taiwan.
A businessman or a retired government official living and working in China is first approached by Chinese military intelligence or the Ministry of State Security (MSS). The person then returns to Taiwan and starts trying to recruit friends and colleagues to help Beijing. After this, normal trips between China, Taiwan and Hong Kong to see family and conduct business are used as cover for intelligence gathering operations for the Chinese.
The MSS allegedly recruited Lo Pin in China and directed him to gather Taiwanese military and intelligence secrets. Lo allegedly met with MSS officers in Hong Kong 12 times since 2007 to exchange money for documents and information on MIB operations against China that he acquired from Lo Chi-cheng.
Western observers, including the US, the UK and Australia, seem to believe that Chinese intelligence agencies operate in a fundamentally different way to themselves and the Russians. Often called the “mosaic” or “thousand grains of sand” view, Western commentators and retired counterintelligence officials believe Chinese intelligence agencies indiscriminately gather up little bits of information, which are then used to assemble a comprehensive picture. In this view, Chinese intelligence does not pay for these “grains of sand,” practice operational spycraft to secure operations, pressure or pay for them.
Shriver and the two Los’ bank accounts show otherwise. Similarly, the MSS held Lo Pin for 15 days and coerced him to cooperate, by implicitly, if not explicitly, threatening his business interests in China.
In these cases, China attempted to collect sensitive US and Taiwanese national security and counterintelligence information. Lo Chi-cheng’s value as an MIB colonel is obvious. Shriver was in the pipeline to join the CIA’s operations directorate and, presumably with his background, would have ended up working in an area related to China. Beijing’s intelligence agencies deliberately — not accidentally or incidentally — aimed their resources toward sensitive information.
The West has mistaken China’s diffuse efforts in the pursuit of national modernization and the acquisition of technology as reflecting the operations of its intelligence agencies in the national security arena.
The intelligence services are just one player among many in China trying to steal technological secrets for the benefit of the military, companies and national development goals.
Despite the multitude of Chinese actors and interests involved, Western analysts have ascribed a coherent intent and methodology to Chinese intelligence and technology collectors. With more illicit technology transfer cases than espionage cases in the West, the amateurish methods of non-professional technology thieves have been mistakenly equated with China’s professional intelligence operatives. This is not a problem of evidence, but one of critical thinking.
If we really want to know what the Chinese intelligence services are doing and how they do it, then we need to remember that intelligence supports policymaking. Beijing’s interests and policymaking cycle will define the information China’s intelligence agencies need to collect.
The sensitivity of that information determines the method of collection. A state does not employ amateurs to penetrate foreign national security establishments; just like a state does not need people trained in clandestine methods to exploit open source material.
Taiwan has learned this lesson the question is when will the West?
Peter Mattis is studying for a master’s degree in security studies at Georgetown University and has experience in research and analytic positions on China-related issues.
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