What’s behind PRC aid?
The human and economic toll of the Jan. 12 earthquake off the coast of Haiti highlights the institutional weakness of many poor countries when faced with natural disasters.
With difficulty providing basic services before the earthquake and the destruction of many aid centers (including the UN mission headquarters), the need for immediate foreign assistance is undeniable. While the international response has been remarkable — mirroring that of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake — another factor may have gone largely unnoticed: China’s offer of assistance.
Chinese offers of post-disaster assistance have become more commonplace in the past decade; however the Haitian case is anomalous in that the Caribbean country is one of the 23 countries with diplomatic relations with Taipei rather than Beijing. Although Chinese assistance has on occasion been granted to non-recognizing countries (such as sending peacekeepers to Haiti in 2004), this usually has been part of “dollar diplomacy” to encourage a switch of diplomatic recognition.
Haiti has been one of Taiwan’s strongest allies since it established relations in 1956, in no small part because Taiwan has been the island’s largest single donor in recent years. Current conditions, however, present an opportunity to tie much needed aid to cutting relations with Taiwan. While one should applaud China rising as a responsible global power, the potential political incentives behind these actions should not be ignored.
TIMOTHY RICH
Bloomington, Indiana
Look in the mirror, Mr Ma
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said recently that “former Democratic Progressive Party legislator [and candidate] Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) is not a Hualien person, only a passerby, and does not have feelings for Hualien.”
Ma was not very careful in choosing his words to criticize the candidate of the opposition party. He should have realized that the manner in which he criticized Hsiao essentially represented a criticism of himself and his party.
Ma’s criticism could easily be substituted with “President Ma is not a Taiwanese, only a passerby, and does not have feelings for Taiwan,” and “the Chinese Nationalist Party is not a local party, only a Chinese party, and does not have feelings for Taiwan.”
Taiwanese are the best judges as to whether these statements are true or false.
CHARLES HONG
Columbus, Ohio
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