Last year, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) made six Taiwan policy proposals, generally known as “Hu’s Six Points,” in a speech to commemorate the 30th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” The practical implementation of these proposals in Taiwan over the past year has been the basis for development of cross-strait relations.
These are the main principles of Hu’s six points.
First, “China and Taiwan should scrupulously abide by the ‘one China’ principle to improve mutual political trust.” In response to this proposal, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has time and again reiterated the so-called “1992 consensus,” which says both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one country. In the eyes of Beijing, this has provided the essential prerequisite for cross-strait negotiations.
Second, “the two sides should sign a comprehensive agreement on economic cooperation to establish a mechanism with cross-strait characteristics.” Ma’s insistence on signing an economic cooperative framework agreement with China is compatible with the spirit of this proposal.
Third, “China is willing to engage in dialogue with Taiwan on cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges to promote Chinese culture.” Taiwan used to claim to represent orthodox Chinese culture, but now the Ma administration has brought up “reading standard characters while writing with simplified characters” — the first positive Taiwanese reaction in 60 years to the simplified character set used in China.
Fourth, “if the Democratic Progressive Party changes its Taiwan independence separatist position, China will make a positive response.” This is the only proposal on which the Ma government has yet to produce any desirable results.
Fifth, “under the condition that it would not lead to ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ the two sides could work out fair and reasonable arrangements through pragmatic talks for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.” In 2007, Beijing sent a letter to the WHO, requesting the inclusion of “Taiwan Province” under China in the implementation of International Health Regulations. Last year, the government attended the World Health Assembly under the name “Chinese Taipei” — a move considered by the Chinese government as participation under the “one China” framework. Apart from that, the Ma administration has suspended Taiwan’s campaign to gain membership in the UN and the WHO, to which former presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) had dedicated a dozen years. The suspension sought to prevent the creation of “two Chinas” or a sovereign and independent Taiwan.
Sixth, “in the special circumstance in which China and Taiwan have yet to be reunited, the two sides could engage in pragmatic negotiations on the development of their political relations and establish a mutual military security mechanism. In addition, the two sides should discuss, under the ‘one-China’ policy, the official ending of the cross-strait state of hostilities and signing a peace accord.” At an international press conference to commemorate his first year in office, Ma said he would not rule out talks with China on political issues if he were to be re-elected in 2012, but a prerequisite would be China removing its missiles aimed at Taiwan. I believe Beijing must have paid close attention to Ma’s call.
Since last year, direct cross-strait transport links have opened and talks between the two sides have been restored. It is clear that nearly every aspect of Hu’s six points is being carried out in practice in Taiwan.
Bill Chang is an advisory committee member at Taiwan Thinktank.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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