When former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Ma Ying-jeou (
In the space of four days, Ma has reversed this position, writing yesterday in the United Daily News that: "Tragic ethnic conflicts such as the 228 Incident are likely to happen again if people allow politicians to continue dividing ethnic groups."
This new stance, which misrepresents the events and political structures of 1947, will probably leave readers rather confused. So, let the facts talk:
After the arrival of the KMT in late 1945, officials and newspaper editorials said Taiwanese had been infected by the Japanese -- on levels of language, culture and identity that can only be sensibly labeled as "ethnic" -- and promised to cure them of their "Japaneseness." This led to stupid policies, such as breaking up families with Japanese members and banning the use in publications of the Japanese language -- Taiwan's lingua franca at the time -- thus severing lines of communication between those of different ethnic groups with limited literacy.
So, ethnicity indeed had a critical role in 228.
All this history may be too complex for Ma to understand. And to this day, Ma may be unaware that his mentor and former employer, president Chiang Ching-kuo (
Yet Ma is the most moderate and conciliatory KMT leader on this issue. He is the KMT man civilized people turn to in the hope of having a dialogue. He can be abused to his face by his foes and he will maintain decorum. Unusual for a KMT leader, he manages to retain a degree of credibility and dignity.
The same cannot be said for most of his senior party colleagues, where there is scant interest in the 228 Incident. Put simply, there is no genuine contrition in the KMT over its criminal past.
The word "responsibility" and apologies may be bandied about, but the KMT has come up pitifully short on what really matters: action.
Action to make amends is the product of true contrition, yet within the KMT, and on its think tank perimeters and across sympathetic academic networks, hardliners consistently act in opposition to the process of accountability. And they still have the upper hand: So-called party moderates rarely speak out with conviction on these matters.
Events that triggered the 228 Incident -- government theft of private property, abuse of international aid, carpetbagging, the killing and mistreatment of ordinary people -- were later reflected in the manner in which top KMT officials made fortunes from the enmeshing of party and state. It is this legacy that the KMT refuses to denounce, let alone seek to correct in a manner respectful of all Taiwanese people.
Instead, we are treated to the KMT and its radical allies saying that accountability for 228 and the White Terror threatens to foment ethnic tension -- a claim that is unspeakably arrogant and malicious.
The real issue is this: Until the KMT can explain why it defends and nurtures extremist views of history and rationalizes theft of public assets, the pan-green-camp voter will look upon it as ill-willed.
Today's KMT leaders did not commit the crimes of 1947 or those thereafter, but they refuse to let go of the booty that the violence helped put in their hands.
Until this changes, the anniversary of the 228 Incident will continue to divide those who want to move forward by facing the past and those who insult the memory of the murdered by lecturing the bereaved on ethnic harmony.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS