Despite the opposition of Taiwan and the international community, China passed an "Anti-Secession" Law, attempting to realize its ambition to invade Taiwan through legal means. The purpose of the legislation is to continue the Chinese civil war and provide a legislative endorsement for a war launched by the executive.
China has no documentary evidence to prove its sovereignty over Taiwan. Its claim is based on its Constitution or the Anti-Secession Law -- which states in Article 2 that, "There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China." Such a unilateral claim does not make Taiwan part of its territory. This is just like Beijing's demand for its allies to acknowledge that Taiwan is part of China when they establish diplomatic ties. It is not legally binding and is merely an exchange of political opinions.
All these communiques and declarations cannot deny the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed in 1951, and the validity of the Republic of China (ROC) government's long-term sovereignty over the island.
The Chinese government is aware of this. So how can it turn Taiwan into part of itself? It attempts to establish the claim through the terms of Article 3 of the Anti-Secession Law, which states that, "The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s."
Only by extending the civil war does it have the right to claim Taiwan's territory and sovereignty. Without the civil war, its claim is absolutely groundless.
Therefore, Article 7 also states that, "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait may consult and negotiate on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides."
In other words, the law clearly shows that a civil war still exists between the two sides today. But does such a state of civil war actually exist? That is a tricky question.
If China believes that the civil war has extended from the Mainland into the Taiwan Strait, then by passing the Anti-Secession Law, Beijing seems to suggest it has been conducting a war against Taiwan for the last 50 years without any legal basis. Or did China discovered that, after over 50 years of peaceful coexistence, it didn't have a legal base for this civil war? The logic of this is very strange.
China claims sovereignty over Taiwan because it sees the cross-strait issue as a remnant from the civil war. This logic does not make sense either. Why is it able to gain Taiwan if a state of war exists between China and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government? According to international laws on land acquisition, since the ROC is the first regime that obtained this land given up by Japan, it certainly enjoys the "preoccupancy" of Taiwan. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has never occupied this land. How can it possibly have sovereignty over Taiwan?
Similarly, whether the ROC has sovereignty or not really depends on the Taiwanese people. There is no country in the world that can unilaterally claim ownership of a piece of land that it does not occupy. Therefore, both legally and in actuality, it is impossible for China to claim sovereignty over Taiwan by stating that a state of civil war still exists.
Furthermore, whether the cross-strait issue remains a remnant of the civil war is not something that Beijing can define unilaterally. To fulfill its ambition to annex Taiwan, Beijing has established the idea of "civil war" by enacting a law.
Taiwan has no intention of going to war with China and has been trying to settle cross-strait differences by adopting a host of laws.
Beijing has also expressed willingness to push ahead with charter cargo flights, the import of Taiwan's agricultural produce, and wants to promote various kinds of cultural and academic exchanges, but the proposals and exchanges seem meaningless as long as both sides remain in a state of civil war or hostility.
However, since 1958, there has not been a war in the Taiwan Strait. What Beijing has done is to adopt a law saying that the civil war continues, and that both sides can officially terminate the cross-strait antagonism as long as Taipei accepts that Taiwan is part of China.
The emergence of a Taiwan independence movement is a domestic matter of the ROC, and there is no need for China to get involved.
China's leadership are delighted with the passage of the law, but this simply shows they have no historical understanding. Since the Qing dynasty, China has repeatedly sought to conquer Vietnam. Vietnam, however, eventually won independence. In 1976, Indonesia's People's Consultative Assembly passed a law to annex East Timor. People in East Timor were unwilling to relent, and staged a military rebellion against Indonesia and finally achieved independence in 2002.
By the same token, Taiwan will not simply take orders from China. Neither will it submit its will to Beijing. It is a shame that China, with its ambitions to be a regional leader, has failed to adopt a receptive and tolerant approach in dealing with Taiwan.
Chen Hurng-yu is a professor in the department of history at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Eddy Chang and Daniel Cheng
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