As the US-Iraq war has turned white-hot, the problem of prisoners of war (POWs) has become a subject of wide speculation. US President George W. Bush has demanded humane treatment for any American POWs in Iraq and threatens that anyone who mistreats captured US soldiers will later be punished as war criminals.
The ways POWs have been dealt with differ with time, space, environment, culture and religion.
Let us take a look at ancient China. Before the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC), most captives from war became the victorious state's slaves, with the exception of a massacre of war captives at the end of the Period of Warring States (403-221 BC). During the Period of Spring and Autumn (770-403 BC), the idea of "benevolence" gradually took shape. With the exception of soldiers and military officials, "the armed forces would not attack unerring cities and would not kill innocent people." After the Qin Dynasty, POWs were treated as war criminals in the succeeding dynasties, all the way to the civil war between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party in the early years of the Republic of China.
During World War II, Japan's military forces believed enemy troops would torture and kill POWs. Japan spread the rumor that "Japanese captives were run over by US tanks on Guadalcanal Island [in the Solomon Islands]." The disgrace of surrender was deeply ingrained in the minds of Japanese people. As a result, the ratio of Japanese soldiers held in captivity to those killed in battle was 142 to 17,166 in the battles fought in Burma. Their adversaries, in contrast, would surrender if those killed in battle accounted for a quarter or a third of the combat forces.
In ancient times, Europeans treated POWs as war criminals, who could be killed at will or enslaved. After the Middle Ages, POWs were generally exchanged or ransomed. They were considered to be the private property of their captors. After the 18th century, humanism filled the air in Europe. The idea of the "individual" began to emerge. Therefore, captured soldiers did not receive punishment on behalf of the country. In 1780, Britain and France signed a pact regarding the exchange of war prisoners. In 1785, the US and Prussia signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Both treaties set the standard procedures for the treatment of POWs: The writ dictated that captives should not be put in chains, they should be sheltered in sanitary conditions and should also be provided with food, drink and everyday necessities in the same way as native soldiers.
In modern times, the procedures regarding the humane treatment of POWs originated in the regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which were passed by the Hague Peace Conference in 1899. A Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was held in 1929. In 1949, another Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was held to revise the articles concluded in the 1929 convention. In 1977, the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) was created. In these conventions, standard procedures were created to deal with various problems related to identification, protection, treatment, coercion and death of POWs and the maintenance of law and order in the prisoner camps.
At present, many academics believe the US has no right to request Iraq to follow the Geneva Conventions for the humane treatment of captured US soldiers because the US violated international law by starting the war in the absence of UN approval. According to the four Geneva Conventions and two Protocols, the key is to respect the human rights of combatants on both sides. Once they lose their status as combatants, they should be entitled to basic, humane treatment. Whether the war is fought on the pretense of justice or aggression, both sides must respect the rights of POWs.
There are a few basic principles regarding the treatment of POWs in modern international humanitarian law:
First, those who lose the ability to fight, withdraw from combat, or do not take part in combat directly should deserve to have their life, mind and body kept in good condition. They should receive protection and humane treatment.
Second, it is forbidden to kill or harm enemy soldiers who surrender or withdraw from combat.
Third, the belligerent parties should gather together the wounded and ill POWs for medical treatment and provide needed care, including medical staff, medical facilities and transport of medical equipment. The Red Cross or Red Crescent, signs of protection, should be respected.
Fourth, the life, dignity, individual rights and beliefs of captured combatants and civilians should be respected. They should receive protection, free of any kind of harm from violence and retaliation. They should have the right to communicate with family members and receive aid.
Fifth, they should have the right to legal protection. They should not be liable for anything they did not directly engage in. Nor should they be subject to physical, mental torture or treatment of a cruel or humiliating nature.
Sixth, the ways and means by which the belligerent parties and their armed forces fight the battles are subject to limitations. It is forbidden to use those weapons and combat plans that cause unnecessary harm.
Seventh, the belligerent parties and their armed forces should always separate the civilian population from combatants, to prevent the civilian population and their property from being harmed. The civilian population should not be attacked. The attack should aim directly at military targets.
According to Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, neither the US nor Iraq should commit acts of "compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power." And according to Article 50, POWs should not be forced to take work "which have no military character or purpose." They include "public works and building operations," "transport and handling of stores," and "public utility services." There is the rumor that Iraq will use the POWs as human shields to fight against the country of these prisoners. Should this rumor become a reality, Iraq's action will be deemed to be most cruel. Iraq will be unable to escape the fate of being indicted by the International Court of Justice for war crimes.
Chiou Bor-haw is completing his doctorate in the Graduate Institute of Political Science at Fu Hsing Kang College.
Translated by Grace Shaw
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