Fri, Dec 28, 2001 page12

• Game theory and cross-strait ties

  • By Tao Zai-pu 陶在樸
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  Dec. 16 was the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, 海協會). Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, 海基會) and the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, 陸委會) congratulated ARATS, saying they wished that talks between the two sides of the Strait could restart as soon as possible.

  For the past 10 years, ARATS has been regarded as an important window for China's Taiwan policies. Even though a window is not the same as a door, which can be used to get in and out, the light coming through the window can show the positives and negatives of cross-strait relations. Unfortunately, very little light has passed through this window since former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) proposed his "state-to-state" model for cross-strait relations.

  When the light will return affects not only cross-strait ties, but also the whole Asia-Pacific region and, above all, the US. The views of two China experts from the US, Andrew Nathan, professor of political science at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, and Harry Harding, dean of The Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, offer two ways of looking at the issue.

  Nathan believes that things are beyond our control, that it will be very difficult for Taiwan to win the trust of China. Following the Dec. 1 legislative elections, he said: "China's greatest fear is that [President] Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) will consolidate his hold on power. They distrust him 110 percent. Adding the Lee Teng-hui factor, their distrust goes even deeper."

  Nathan said that whether China trusts Taiwan or not is beyond our control, but that doesn't mean we should ignore the Chinese or their opinions; we have to face them. He also said: "Taiwanese authorities have always been painting too bright a picture, underestimating the possibility of armed attack."

  Harding, however, suggests that the best way to revive cross-strait relations is to forget the deadlock and start anew by integrating economically.

  On Dec. 14th, at a seminar arranged by Taiwan's Asia Foundation (亞洲基金會), Harding said: "Rather than Taiwan and the US together containing China, they should help China join the international community." This could be done by initiating cross-strait economic cooperation, for example, using it as a bridge toward further integration.

  These two professors give a good insight into the thinking behind Taiwanese policy toward China: on the one hand, things are beyond our control, and on the other, economic leverage can be used successfully. Like the pendulum of a clock, these two forces gain ascendancy in cycles. But if the pendulum is unbalanced, the result will be asymmetric behavior. The stronger force will appear more frequently and the weaker force will never reach its optimum position.

  As a result, the movement will not be cyclical. There will be just complex and unpredictable chaos.

  Many people are critical of Taiwan's cross-strait policies, possibly because the thinking that things are beyond our control is stronger than that which is optimistic about economic leverage.

  Society is teeming with discussion about how economic leverage can facilitate cross-strait integration. However, there is not so much discussion about how ties are affected by the thinking that things are beyond our control. In the conflict and cooperation of game theory, how to play the "things-are-beyond-our-control" game is a matter of strategy and technique, not a question of pessimistic or optimistic expectations. Nor is it a question of values of good or bad.

  The "prisoner's dilemma" model, for example, is used to study the "beyond-our-control" game in strategies.

  In the game, two in-for-life prisoners decide to dig a hole and escape. If they cooperate, keep their actions secret and attain freedom, then they get a pre-determined score of three. If one of them snitches on the other to gain leniency and an early release from prison, the former gets five points, while the latter gets zero. If both prisoners betray each other, abandon the escape plan and remain in prison, then the score is one each.

  Because the chance of escape is not high, there is a temptation to betray the other and gain a higher score. In other words, betrayal is more attractive to both. Whether the other side will cooperate is not something within our control. What then is the best strategy in the dilemma between betrayal and cooperation?

  A strategy game held in the US and Europe in the early 1980s used a computer simulation to calculate the scores gained by various strategies. As a result, Anatol Rapaport, a psychologist and peace activist from the University of Toronto, won the top prize. His strategy was very simple. His first step was always to cooperate. Then he did as the other side did.

  This strategy, which has been named "tit-for-tat" by scholars, has three characteristics: nice, forgiving and retaliatory. It is nice because it always begins by cooperating with the other side. It is forgiving because even after many betrayals by the other side, it still reciprocates cooperation immediately. It is also retaliatory because even after many instances of cooperation, it retaliates against betrayal immediately.

  Even though cross-strait relations are far more complex than the prisoner's dilemma game, the latter still provides a model for resolving the cross-strait impasse.

  First, be a pragmatist, not an idealist. Idealists take ultimate interests as a point of departure and stress the importance of gaining scores in every round. They also believe that victory in every round is the only way to ensure final victory. Pragmatists take relative interests as a point of departure. They believe victory and defeat only have relative significance. They always adopt a strategy of choosing the lesser of two dangers.

  Second, conflict and cooperation are evolving processes, not mechanical wrestling processes. Therefore, one does not feel inferior or lose confidence before a stronger enemy.

  Third, policy stability depends not only on whether it is gradual or drastic, but also on the openness of policy thinking. The more open the policy thinking, the more external energy it can attract and the better targeted the policy will be. Tit-for-tat strategic thinking is the result of great openness.

  Tao Zai-pu is a consultant at the Mainland Affairs Council.

  Translated by Perry Svensson and Francis Huang
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