The convictions of Major Liu Chih-chung (
As is often the case, the government, in particular the Ministry of Defense and the various branches of the military, is not really focusing on the root causes of the problem. Rather they are trying to make a scapegoat out of the media and apply a quick fix.
The root causes of Taiwan's inability to protect military secrets are several; leaks to the media are the least of them. However, rather than deal intelligently with the whole issue of military security, what the Chen administration has done is simply cast the media as the "bad guys" and try and apply a quick fix.
The fix in this case is new legislation. The proposed "National Secrets Protection Law" is pending in the Legislative Yuan. If it follows the course of most legislation in that assembly, however, it will be pending there for perhaps a long time.
Of course the quick fix also includes the usual idiotic statements by the military, in this case supplied by Chief of the General Staff General Tang Yao-ming (湯曜明).
Yang told reporters at the Journalist Day Banquet on Aug. 29: "It's our family business, we are taking care of our own affairs. Those who should be put to death will be put to death." Senior officers are proposing a reward of NT$200,000 (US$5,800) for people pinpointing informers within the armed forces.
Making the media the scapegoat is a popular approach with the military. To blame the media and to try and put a "chill" on reporting serves the military's interest.
In fact, Taiwan's military is not really concerned with national security. It is concerned that its own wrongdoings and ill preparedness will come to light. To forestall that, the military uses the excuse of "national security" to limit the media's work.
By "wrongdoings" I refer to such things as the Lafayette frigate scandal, uninvestigated deaths in the military, the incredibly high incident of injuries and disabilities suffered by conscripts and related issues.
Taiwan's military is in no better position to fight a war than their predecessors were under Chiang Kai Shek (
The situation, I surmise, is basically unchanged. You have aging generals whose fitness for office can be surmised in listing their connections with the KMT, a conscript army that is poorly treated and widespread personal profiteering.
The military would prefer the public to remain ignorant of these facts. Toward that end, squelching the media is an excellent solution. And the rubric of "national security" provides an excellent excuse.
If in fact the military was concerned with "national security" they would do well to turn their attention to "spy catching" rather than making scapegoats of the media.
The National Security Bureau is always at pains to inform the public that "spies are everywhere." On the face of it, that would seem to make it easy to catch them. But as Jane's Defense Weekly has pointed out, "Taiwan has not arrested a suspected Chinese intelligence operative since the capture of four people on a Chinese spy boat" in June of last year.
It seems that the military has better luck catching journalist than spies.
Brian Kennedy is an attorney who writes and teaches on criminal justice and human rights issues.
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) concludes his fourth visit to China since leaving office, Taiwan finds itself once again trapped in a familiar cycle of political theater. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has criticized Ma’s participation in the Straits Forum as “dancing with Beijing,” while the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) defends it as an act of constitutional diplomacy. Both sides miss a crucial point: The real question is not whether Ma’s visit helps or hurts Taiwan — it is why Taiwan lacks a sophisticated, multi-track approach to one of the most complex geopolitical relationships in the world. The disagreement reduces Taiwan’s
A foreign colleague of mine asked me recently, “What is a safe distance from potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force’s (PLARF) Taiwan targets?” This article will answer this question and help people living in Taiwan have a deeper understanding of the threat. Why is it important to understand PLA/PLARF targeting strategy? According to RAND analysis, the PLA’s “systems destruction warfare” focuses on crippling an adversary’s operational system by targeting its networks, especially leadership, command and control (C2) nodes, sensors, and information hubs. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, noted in his 15 May 2025 Sedona Forum keynote speech that, as
Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is visiting China, where he is addressed in a few ways, but never as a former president. On Sunday, he attended the Straits Forum in Xiamen, not as a former president of Taiwan, but as a former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman. There, he met with Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning (王滬寧). Presumably, Wang at least would have been aware that Ma had once been president, and yet he did not mention that fact, referring to him only as “Mr Ma Ying-jeou.” Perhaps the apparent oversight was not intended to convey a lack of
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) last week announced that the KMT was launching “Operation Patriot” in response to an unprecedented massive campaign to recall 31 KMT legislators. However, his action has also raised questions and doubts: Are these so-called “patriots” pledging allegiance to the country or to the party? While all KMT-proposed campaigns to recall Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmakers have failed, and a growing number of local KMT chapter personnel have been indicted for allegedly forging petition signatures, media reports said that at least 26 recall motions against KMT legislators have passed the second signature threshold
RSS