The "confederation" with China that KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) advocated prior to the presidential election will be written into the party charter. This concrete declaration is different from former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) "state-to-state" model, and much more explicit than the Guidelines for National Unification (國統綱領). Due to the sensitivity of the year-end legislative elections, Lien's advocacy of a confederacy, implying the dawn of negotiations between the two sides, will lead to another wave of unification-independence battles at the end of the year -- something we all await in anticipation.
Ever since President Chen Shui-bian (
Unificationists in Taiwan have for a long time seen so-called confederation as the way to unify the two sides, whereas the Chinese government has long since set the tune by insisting on one country, two systems.
The understanding of a
confederacy among Chinese scholars is that it is not a true unification of two countries, and therefore violates the one country, two systems concept. They believe that, according to international legal theory, a confederation is made up of more than two sovereign countries uniting on the basis of international treaties, and it does not in itself contain the basic requirements for the creation of a nation. A confederation in particular does not possess any powers of enforcement, and countries are free to join or leave. The notion of two sides being joined in a confederation is no different than the idea of "two Chinas," or "one China, one Taiwan."
The Beijing government sees confederation as advocacy for Taiwan independence, but independence advocates see it as capitulation, since the sovereignty of Taiwan's defense and diplomacy will be restricted by China after its establishment. Historically, na-tions that have established confederations have always done so with the goal of establishing a unified country. Does Taiwan really have to be in such a rush to enter into a confederation and speed up China's unification? Confederation is therefore not accepted by the Chinese government, and independence advocates see it as a sell-out of Taiwan in order to achieve rapid unification. Seeing a confederacy as a miracle cure is overly optimistic, and if the KMT writes it into its charter at this time, they will only be giving the DPP a clear theme on which to base its election campaign.
The impasse between the two sides of the Strait stems from the ideological battle over sovereignty. China wants Taiwan to accept the one-China principle and the concept of one country, two systems. It wants Taiwan to capitulate and to reduce Taiwan's government to a local government.
Once Taiwan accepts the one country, two systems concept, the relationship between the two sides will change. It will look more like a confederacy or a commonwealth, even though some Chinese scholars have suggested that Taiwan keep its own defense forces. In Taiwan, however, regardless of whether it is the unificationists advocating a confederation, Chen championing the integrationist stand, or the independence proponents advocating the establishment of a new country, everyone wants to ensure equality between Taiwan and China. The two sides cannot therefore take the first step toward negotiations due to a lack of common ground.
National security, the preservation of national dignity and insistence on equality seem to have become the will of the public. Not even someone in favor of unification dares violate the idea of placing Taiwan first. Whenever there is a call-in TV-program and the opponent is a Chinese scholar, independence and unificationist legislators will always wind up on the same side, opposing the scholar. The cross-strait opinions proclaimed by each political party in Taiwan are not accepted by Beijing and therefore become just election platforms.
Fuzziness and flaccidity become the main characteristics of China policies. Making confederation a part of the KMT charter will not make it the foundation for future negotiations between the two sides, and Lien Chan's advocacy of a confederation will only become the DPP's target in the election battle.
Lee Ching-hsiung is a legislator for the Taiwan Independence Party.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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