Policy-wise, Taiwan's political parties do not differ much. But parties with blurry personalities aside, the DDP stands out in one regard -- a party platform that advocates a public referendum on Taiwan's independence. The platform not only reveals the DDP's eventual goal for Taiwan's national status, but also pinpoints democratic autonomy as the path to self-determination by Taiwan's residents. The platform also symbolizes the DPP forefathers' resistance to political oppression. These reasons make the DPP independence platform highly significant.
To win the votes of moderates in the presidential election, the DPP acknowledged that "Taiwan is a sovereign independent country, and its name is the Republic of China." After DPP nominee Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) won the election, the possibility of Taiwan's independence has become a reality. Changing the name of the country is no longer necessary to achieve Taiwan independence, because the party now rules a sovereign and independent Republic of China. The practical significance of the independence platform is thus lost.
However, there is still a need to create a positive and fruitful atmosphere between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to defrost the cross-strait standoff. To this end, DPP legislator Chen Zau-nan (陳昭南) proposed dismantling the DPP's independence platform.
His suggestion has incurred both praise and criticism. Some feel that the move was a DPP initiative to clear China's suspicion that Chen -- as drafter of the DPP's party platforms -- is pro-independence in stance. They regard the move as a sincere one by the DPP and one that could lead to better cross-strait relations.
There are also those who believe that Chen has already given sufficient goodwill and may have betrayed the wishes of the DPP and the people of Taiwan by warming up to the idea of "`one China' with each side free to make its own interpretation (各自表述一個中國)."
As China has not reciprocated with any substantive goodwill, many believe the DPP's withdrawal of its independence platform may leave the DPP with no position to bargain with China in the event that it uses force against Taiwan. Therefore, the opposition against Chen Zau-nan's proposal has certainly been significant.
Chen Zau-nan's withdrawal of his proposal before the DPP's national congress convened was a wise move. As stated by Chen Zau-nan himself, the Taiwan independence platform is a useful weapon. When he submitted his proposal, he had hoped that China would promise to terminate the long-term standoff between the two sides of the Strait. However, China has failed to respond so far.
Recently China's minister of defense Chi Haotian (
But before we can determine whether China has expressed any goodwill, is it wise for the DPP and Taiwan to disarm entirely?
Thinking is polarized in Taiwan -- there are those who advocate the codification of the National Unification Guidelines (
With the co-existence of such views, we should retain the greatest possible flexibility in policy that will decide Taiwan's future.
Currently, Taiwan needs to neither codify nor change the National Unification Guidelines. Similarly, there is no need to either promote the DPP's independence platform nor remove it.
Why push ourselves into a corner before an internal consensus is reached and before China finalizes its responses?
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