A new sense of regionalism is transforming East Asia but Australia has completely failed to adequately assess the changes and risks being left out.
Take ASEAN plus three for example. This grouping joins the 10 Southeast Asian countries with the three major Northeast Asian countries (the PRC, Japan, South Korea). The first meeting of this body was held in 1997 when the ramifications of the Asian crisis were just becoming clear. Its purpose is to not only explore areas of common interest with the three major Northeast Asian countries to ASEAN's north but, far more importantly, to find official channels for the equal engagement of the PRC and Japan. This purpose seeks the difficult goal of putting past fears finally to rest [in the case of Japan] and attempts to prevent new fears from being realized [in the case of the PRC].
In November 1999, the third ASEAN plus three meeting was held. For the first time all heads of state were present. As a result of that meeting, summits will now be held between the leaders of the PRC, Japan and South Korea on an irregular basis. Once these three countries can overcome their bilateral differences to work together, the development of an East Asian community will be that much faster.
Illustration: By Yu Sha
But despite Australia's interests in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, it will not be involved.
From these meetings have emerged truly regional committees aimed at tackling issues of region-wide importance -- not limited to vague suggestions of free trade and currency swaps but also including common social, environmental, educational and labor issues.
What happens to Australia's export market in education if, given the dependence of Australian universities and other educational institutions on students from the region, an East Asia bloc pressures Australia into lowering fees or changing entrance qualifications? What happens to Australia's energy exports if the regional energy grid, long an ambition of many regional countries but unable to be realized due to an absence of an overarching body, is realized with East Timor rather than Australia as the southern resource anchor?
It would be good if Australia was present in these meetings to advance its cause, but that, for the present government, would be an act of begging rather than a simple request.
If these scenarios are unbelievable then consider this. The Reserve Bank of Australia is a member of a regional network of central banks, called EMEAP. Since 1990 the top officials from these banks have been coming together to exchange information and expertise. The personal networks generated through EMEAP means that Australian officials have developed exceptionally strong relations with their regional counterparts. The value of this network was clearly demonstrated with the Asian crisis.
Just before the Thai baht was devalued, EMEAP met. As a result Australia possessed critical information (unavailable to the Europeans or Americans) that helped it take decisive action to assist in shoring up regional economies so that it was not dragged down as well. With the creation of the Manila Framework Group (MFG) finance ministries were joined with central banks to help mitigate against the worst of the crisis.
But now there is a new network, an East Asian network. This network, created under ASEAN auspices, has now expanded under the ASEAN plus three framework. In terms of central banks and finance ministries this network is EMEAP and the MFG minus Australia and New Zealand.
Couple this with the expansion of ASEAN officials and senior officials meetings from regional finance ministries to include their Northeast Asian counterparts and all of a sudden information is being shared and personal contacts are being established that are devoid of an Australian presence.
One only has to log on to the ASEAN website to see just how many meetings are taking place in Southeast Asia. Expand those meetings, as is planned, to include Northeast Asian officials from every conceivable ministry and you immediately get a sense of just how serious and wide-ranging the new regionalism actually is.
And it is not just at the official level. The work of ASEAN plus three is being underpinned at the Track Two level by the work of the East Asian Vision Group (EVAG). This group of eminent persons meets twice a year. Their brief is to identify issues of regional concern and suggest common ways of dealing with them. The EAVG is comprised of business leaders as well as senior officials and retired ministers.
Most of the interests the EAVG will examine (such as human development) are shared by Australian policy makers, but they are not involved. Why? Because any request to join such bodies would be seen by the present government as kowtowing to Asia. So once again Australians are on the outside looking in.
Even civil society is being developed beyond its domestic cradle. There now exist some 50 or more transregional civil society organizations operating within the ASEAN context in much the same way as NGOs are used as alternate sources of information by the World Bank and the UN. And this figure grows every year.
So, why isn't Australia involved? A fair sized chunk of the problem lies in its recent behavior over East Timor. No one in the region, except some now thoroughly discredited members of Indonesia's TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - the National Army), disputes the fact that Australia did a first-rate job in bringing peace to East Timor.
What has generated criticism in the region is the spate of stupid comments from senior members of government that were not immediately retracted. Statements that Australian forces would pursue TNI and militia members over the border into West Timor [an act of war] and that Australia was essentially a deputy sheriff to the US were seen as both expansionist and neo-colonial by many in the region.
These statements as well as the strongly nationalistic manner in which Australian peacekeepers were sent off has raised serious questions in East Asia as to Australia's real intentions towards its neighbors, not just Indonesia. The idea that the government is on some sort of civilizing mission in the region is now being taken as credible. As a senior regional policy-maker recently said, Australia now has a real image problem that has set us back a long way. Why? Simply because we are not doing anything to counteract these negative images.
Even more damaging for Australia's long term interests in East Asia is the view that has recently surfaced in the region that perhaps the equality espoused by former Prime Minister Paul Keating in dealing with our neighbors was the exception rather than the rule. If this becomes the standard belief then Australia will never be able to make up the lost ground.
If not into the region then where does it go? Australia cannot flourish and develop as a strong, vibrant country by itself. The EU is closed to Australia and it said no to NAFTA. The "Closer Economic Relationship" (CER) with New Zealand is good but insufficient to meet Australia's needs. Australia is currently trying to join CER with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This is an important step in the right direction but, at the same time, Australia is excluded from the ASEAN-EU economic and trade meetings. Why? Because it is not seen as a truly regional player.
The sad thing about all this is that Australia has some real supporters in the region. Not only those who naturally see it as a valid player in regional relations in its own right but also those men and women who came out to Australia under the Colombo Plan, who now occupy senior positions in regional businesses, governments and the social sectors. This cohort general has very positive images of Australia and Australians. But they cannot support Australia while it acts in such an arrogant and triumphalist manner.
Asking to be an equal partner in the new regional arrangements is not the same as begging to join. It is Australia's future that is being jeopardized, but only Australia's present can do anything about it.
Nick Thomas is a research fellow at The Asia-Australia Institute, Australia's pre-eminent think tank on regionalism and Second Track diplomacy.
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