The US will hand over control of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian government by the end of the year. The handover symbolizes Panama's victory in securing its sovereignty, but represents a serious challenge to our government, already very short of space for international political maneuvering.
From a geo-political perspective, the handing over of the Panama Canal will provide Taiwan with a new viewpoint for examining international relations. In 1903, the US and Panama signed a treaty granting the US the right to construct the canal. Construction on the 81.6km-long canal was finally completed on Aug. 15, 1914. The canal reduced the ocean passage between the east and west coasts of the US by 8,000 nautical miles. This was crucial for the US during the two World Wars, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Later scientific breakthroughs and advances in air transport allowed for faster transport of large volumes of materials and manpower by air, lowering the strategic value of the canal for the US.
The Panamanian government signed a new treaty with the US government in 1977 following shifts in international geo-political relations and after General Torrijos threatened to occupy portions of the canal. The 1977 treaty put the canal under the jurisdiction of the Panamanian government and forced the US to cede control of the canal to Panama at the end of 1999. This process shows that technological advances can alter the importance of strategic areas. This holds true for the Panama Canal as well as the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's export-oriented economy does not allow Taiwan to fully adopt the superpower geo-political strategy of the US.
The handing over of the Panama Canal may have negative implications for Taiwan. Taiwan's system of air transport is developed, but it is only economically feasible to ship bulk items between countries by sea. Sea lanes are still vitally important if countries hope to upgrade their national economies, and are crucial for national security and a country's overall strength.
The Panamanian government agreed in 1997 to allow the Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd to run terminal operations at two ports on the canal for 25 to 50 years. Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd has extensive connections with the government, army, and Communist Party in China, and this may have a far-reaching impact on Taiwan's future economic development. According to Law No. 5 in Panama, Hutchinson Whampoa can send navigators to the ports to guide ships through the canal, and the company has the right to refuse passage to ships for economic reasons.
A reserve clause in the treaty between the US and Panama states that if the canal is blockaded or its normal operations are disturbed, then both the US and Panama have the right to use necessary measures to reopen the canal, including the use of force. But if Hutchinson Whampoa arbitrarily interprets "economic reasons" and holds up ships from Taiwan, would Panama or the US do anything about it? We should think of ways of linking up the interests of the US and Taiwan in relation to the canal, to avoid China holding up Taiwan's economic development.
The handing over of the Panama Canal affords an opportunity for us to test the "preventative diplomacy" of our foreign ministry. Successful preventative diplomacy requires that two conditions are met: those who decide on foreign policy must be able to both predict and defuse potentially explosive diplomatic hot spots.
The handover will test whether the foreign ministry is able to effectively engage in "preventative diplomacy." It doesn't take a clairvoyant to sense the impending crisis. How does Taiwan plan to react to the handover?
Antonio C. Hsiang is a doctor of political science from Claremont Graduate University, USA.
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