Current economic-based cross-strait relations could inevitably be pushed toward a more political interaction once the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 18th National Congress finishes turning power over to its new leaders, the Mainland Affairs Council’s (MAC) Advisory Committee said.
The council yesterday published on its Web site a summary of a meeting held by the committee, during which an assessment of cross-strait relations after the Jan. 14 presidential election was discussed.
China’s gradual implementation of “Hu’s six points” — China’s Taiwan policy blueprint modeled after Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) “Message to compatriots in Taiwan” on Jan. 1, 2009 — after Taiwan’s most recent presidential election would allow China to create more advantageous conditions for dialogue in the event of future cross-strait political negotiations after increased contact with Taiwanese society, thereby swaying Taiwanese to their cause, some committee members said.
Academics said that China, through its Taiwan policy, hopes to steer cross-strait development peacefully and keep cross-strait relations free from interference should Taiwan’s internal political situation change.
Judging from the three main environmental factors that might influence China’s Taiwan policy, China does not see the necessity or possibility of altering “Hu’s six points” in the short term after Taiwan’s presidential election, committee members said.
The committee assessed that for the time being, cross-strait relations would maintain the “status quo” under President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) “three noes” policy — no unification, no independence and no use of force — while using the so-called “1992 consensus” to promote cross-strait ties based on the principles of “economics first, politics later; easy decisions first, tough calls later.”
The “1992 consensus” refers to a supposed understanding the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) says was reached during a meeting in Hong Kong in 1992 between KMT and CCP representatives, under which both sides claim to have acknowledged that there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “one China” means.
The Democratic Progressive Party contends that the “1992 consensus” does not exist.
Pointing out the importance of forming a national consensus in the event of future political negotiations, committee members suggested that the Constitution should be the basis of forming a national consensus.
They added that the government should also establish transparent communicative channels with the Legislative Yuan, opposition parties, the media and other civilian agencies to make party politics a prime governmental asset to promote policies.
Such measures would also prepare Taiwan for the possibility of cross-strait political dialogue and negotiations, while legalizing various interactions across the Strait, committee members said. However, they added that the formation of national consensus could prove to be the greatest challenge to cross-strait relations.
It would also help in the evaluation of risks in the future direction and development of cross-strait policy, and forming a consensus of such policies within the nation, as well as making certain what position Taiwan would take during political dialogues and negotiations, the committee said.