Those familiar with Taiwan’s political scene will recall the name Yu Wen (余文), a Taipei City Government staffer during President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) stint as mayor from 1998 to 2006. Following Ma’s indictment in 2006 for misusing his special allowance, Yu became a fall guy in some observers’ eyes, serving nine months in jail for failing to keep Ma’s accounts in order.
The term “Yu Wen” has since become part of Taiwan’s political lingo. It refers to a government official or agency that serves as a scapegoat and takes the heat for higher-ups.
Amid the eruption over the government’s decision to lift a ban on US beef and offal, Department of Health (DOH) Minister Yaung Chih-liang (楊志良) appears to be Ma’s latest “Yu Wen.”
A DOH statement on Friday expanding US beef imports generated public anger and infuriated lawmakers across party lines; the latter were seemingly caught off guard by the announcement amid enduring concerns over mad-cow disease.
With all arrows shooting in the DOH’s direction, Ma, in an interview published yesterday, was quick to single out his health minister, saying that Yaung should take responsibility for failing to provide the public with a clear account of the situation.
This makes little sense, as it is extremely unlikely that the DOH has the power to make the final call on issues that stray into areas of diplomatic sensitivity.
A legislative resolution passed in 2006 requires the DOH to report in detail to the legislature before lifting bans on US beef. With DOH Deputy Minister Hsiao Mei-ling (蕭美玲) openly acknowledging on Friday that the DOH announcement violated this resolution, it becomes clear that there must have been a higher authority that compelled the DOH to proceed — despite the inevitable response from the legislature.
That authority could hardly be the Cabinet, judging from Premier Wu Den-yih’s (吳敦義) rather blunt remarks on Saturday. He said: “How could I have the authority to finalize the policy? I didn’t even know the details.” It is also noteworthy that Wu endorsed the 2006 resolution as a legislator.
Factor in diplomatic concerns and it is highly unlikely that the DOH or the premier would have dared to make the “final call” on US beef without a directive from — or at least the blessing of — the Presidential Office and the National Security Council.
Presidential Office Spokesman Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) on Saturday said the lifting of the beef ban was a “joint decision” in which the government acted in concert. This is hopelessly inconsistent with Ma’s attack on the health minister.
Since Ma took office, a disturbing pattern has developed in which lower-order government officials shoulder responsibility for disasters created by their superiors. Such Yu Wen figures include then-director-general of highways James Chen (陳晉源) — the only official to take responsibility in September last year when floodwater caused the Houfeng Bridge (后豐橋) to collapse, claiming six lives — and then-deputy minister Andrew Hsia (夏立言), who took the heat for the government’s initial rejection of foreign aid in the wake of Typhoon Morakot in August.
The more “Yu Wen” figures there are, the more Taiwan will suffer as it endures an incompetent government lined with officials who bask in their power but shy away from responsibility.
Will a real decision-maker stand up?
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