In irritation and impatience, Taiwan has launched its plan for the indigenous development and acquisition of conventional submarines.
Ever since the military balance across the Taiwan Strait shifted significantly toward China, Taiwan has been prevented from acquiring a foreign-made conventional sub — a small, but indispensable component of military power.
The US, Taiwan’s sole security guarantor, only agreed to preserve the “status quo” after switching diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979.
On the basis of the Taiwan Relations Act, it provides the nation only with defensive weapons, which effectively excludes submarines. All the other sub-exporting countries also follow this line for fear of diplomatic, trade and other retaliations from Beijing.
However, in rushing ahead with the plan, the government failed to walk the tightrope of the “status quo” restriction necessary to achieving a successful acquisition. It did not set the appropriate size, capability and other parameters of the subs to be built.
SUBOPTIMAL PLAN
Instead, Taiwan vainly announced an ambitious plan without first importing essential systems and engineering, production and system-integration technologies.
Without them, the nation will only be able to build suboptimal subs, which will waste resources that could otherwise have been used for alternative defensive weapons, such as additional high-performance underwater mines.
What is permissible for Taiwan under the “status quo” restriction is to acquire a dozen small or two medium-sized subs, with a standard displacement of 450 to 900 tonnes, only for littoral operation in the Taiwan Strait and vicinity against a possible full amphibious invasion from China. This would exclude missions in the western Pacific Ocean in general and the seas along the eastern coast of Taiwan in particular.
Given the shallow depth of the Strait, these subs only need to submerge to 100m below sea level and no more than 200m.
These parameters mean that Taiwan’s need for subs could be satisfied by acquiring highly reliable subs made by 1960s and 1970s standards, particularly given China’s poor anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which are unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future.
ALLIES’ CONCERNS
Going beyond such parameters would go against the interests not only of the US, but also of the US’ major allies, including Japan.
Given China’s rapidly growing military power, including its submarine fleet, the US is aware of Taiwan’s need to strengthen its insubstantial countervailing power, at least to an extent that would hamper a Chinese invasion until the US could come to Taiwan’s rescue.
In 2001, then-US president George W. Bush agreed to sell eight diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan.
However, the US and its major allies became increasingly economically interdependent with China and needed to cooperate with China on international security concerns.
It is no wonder that subsequent US administrations have dishonored the 2001 agreement by effectively ignoring Taiwan’s high-profile request for subs.
The US itself no longer builds conventional submarines, only nuclear ones. It shut down the production lines for conventional subs several decades ago.
With their program dismantled and those with the expertise and experience dispersed, it would be highly costly — practically impossible — for them to reconstruct a production line from old design drawings and other records.
JAPAN’S ROLE
Japan is the only active builder of advanced conventional subs that has grave concerns over Taiwan’s security, while buttressing its sole security guarantor, the US, through a robust bilateral alliance.
Washington and Tokyo could assist Taiwan in accomplishing a submarine program that falls within the “status quo” restriction, if Taiwan is willing to accept.
Tokyo has retained design drawings and other records of its outdated, homegrown small and medium-sized subs. It could share them — along with some expertise from Washington — without any direct formal contact.
The three nations could base their actions on two bilateral agreements for sharing military secrets. Although the technical information alone would never enable the construction of subs with high reliability and effectiveness, it would surely facilitate their construction.
In any case, Tokyo would probably be reluctant to share advanced technology related to its most recently commissioned state-of-the-art large subs, particularly when it suspects Beijing of committing economic espionage in Taiwan.
Under the “status quo” restriction, Tokyo itself strictly refrains from selling any subs to Taiwan, although it could lease them to the US for their long-term sublease to Taiwan.
POSSIBLE REPRISALS
Of course, Washington would risk protestations from Beijing.
However, given the precedent of Russia leasing a nuclear attack submarine to India, it would be feasible for Tokyo to make legal arrangements with the US under the arms transfer policy of 2014 and within the framework of the national security laws of last year.
Needless to say, Tokyo remains capable of building small and medium-sized subs to the standard of its outdated models, while using existing production lines of its two prime contractors, their engineers and technicians, and their suppliers of systems and materials.
To nudge Washington and Tokyo, Taiwan must first strictly limit its politico-strategic objectives of sub acquisition, setting aside its overly ambitious goal.
To facilitate the possibility of sharing sensitive information, it must conclude a technical information security agreement with Tokyo through an informal representative, emulating the agreement with Washington.
It remains to be seen when a window of opportunity will open, but given the reinforced Japan-US alliance against China’s rapid military build-up, Taiwan had better prepare for the moment to come.
Masahiro Matsumura is a professor of International Politics and National Security at Saint Andrew’s University in Osaka.
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